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PREFACE: 
 
During the Tunisian uprising, no one knew what would happen. Late night Skype 
sessions with Tunisian friends revealed that they too were uncertain about the future. The 
“Arab Spring” was not yet the assigned moniker as Tunisia was the only country then 
consumed by mass revolt. Television channels barely focused on this ostensibly tiny 
North African country whose regional impact was at that point perceived as negligible. 
Attempting to recall the emotional spectra of those days is a daily-diminishing return, as 
at the time of this writing the region continues to struggle frustratingly with the politics of 
rule. Syria is still engulfed by violence, Egyptians are split as to the next step, and 
Tunisia is still attempting to craft a cohesive national identity. 
  While chatting online during the Tunisian uprising, a friend directed me towards 
the music that was being made about the event. I was instantly captivated: I had in the 
past personally witnessed a country and a people, dominated in nearly every facet of its 
existence, and suddenly (or so it seemed) there was this outpouring of political 
dissidence. My first inclination was to articulate a thesis examining how Tunisian hip hop 
had become a vector of resistance against the Ben Ali regime. It seemed simple enough. 
However, after much research I realized that my framework itself was inadequate to 
responsibly capture the role of art in Tunisian politics.  
The abundance of problematics within my own frameworks, and in those within 
the international news media framing the events, would therefore have to be overcome in 
order to convey an accurate depiction of my object of study. First and foremost, the 
concept of resistance was wholly inaccurate, especially when applied to an entire genre. 
Second, hip hop was not always necessarily political in Tunisia, and much of the political 
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contestation was made in other genres such as folk and reggae. Third, the formerly 
ubiquitous discourses of Tunisia’s ‘tradition’ of political passivity, as well as the role (or 
supposed lack thereof) of ‘traditional’ Tunisian arts in the uprising would have to be 
revisited. Fourth, as music continued to be made after the flight of Ben Ali, at first 
celebratory and nationalistic, and later returning to issues both concrete and abstract 
immediately faced by the Tunisian people, the realization struck me: the post-revolution 
celebratory music was not simply a commodification of the uprising, but simultaneously 
a reflection and articulation of sentiments, and therefore not logically distinct from that 
made by artist-activists during the event. For this reason, I have decided not to make too 
large an ethical distinction between works before, during, and after the revolution, 
although I do distinguish among the types of capital(s) sought after at a given point in 
time. Fifth, themes of nationalism and human rights abound in different times in the 
lyrics of many Tunisian works, yet they are used in different ways and the suspicion 
framing both concepts betray the way that they may have been used by the former 
regime. Therefore, a brief examination of human rights and nationalism theory becomes 
essential and only later when lyrics are presented may the non-expert reader come to 
understand the aura of conflict that plagues these concepts and thus emerges in the music 
of political dissidence.   
Sixth, and perhaps most central to the argument articulated in this thesis, Tunisian 
music, activism, and the international news media intersected in highly complex and 
nuanced ways. Therefore, to examine themes of political contestation in Tunisian music 
would remove a key component of the dynamic. These three fields cannot be isolated 
from the rest of Tunisian culture, separated from the supposedly universalist discourses 
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of morality projected by international news outlets, or cleaved from the many diverse 
aims of all players involved. However, amid the rush to establish causality in the recent 
uprisings, I hope that my examination of the interplay between the artist, activist, and 
international news media fields (which despite their complexity, and the existence of 
countless other fields with which they intersect, I strongly feel must be the limits of my 
own reduction) will add depth and nuance to existing narratives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION:  
 
This thesis examines the transformations of cultural, symbolic and material 
capital (and power) within and among the fields of music, activism, and journalism 
during the recent uprising in Tunisia. Analyzing a selection of Tunisian music juxtaposed 
to several ubiquitous conjectures in the news media, I also challenge interpretations of the 
part music played in these revolutions. In the wake of Zine Abidin Ben Ali’s ouster from 
the presidency, many in the international press and music industry credited hip-hop artists 
in Tunisia as being a driving force in the 14 January Revolution. Many commentators cite 
substantially increased levels of outspokenness against the regime among the artist 
community and therefore detect a significant rupture with past traditions. Yet by 
analyzing cultural productions of the past decade, one can find many examples of artists, 
bloggers, workers, and activists speaking out against the regime; thus, the contention that 
an unprecedented level of activism arose among the artist community in late 2010 
requires further discussion. In addition, the function that the international news media 
played in the revolution by elevating certain artists (and thus consecration of their 
musical-activist capital) is often ignored or unacknowledged.  However, evidence 
suggests that the artists in question seemed implicitly aware of this dynamic and often 
used it to their advantage. Music, as a cultural product, both influences and mirrors 
widespread public opinion(s). The interplay between political music and public sentiment 
is instructive when examined through transformations of capital, particularly because an 
increased amount of intangible capital can be converted to material capital when the artist 
is lauded by international observers. Additionally, by positing the regime of Ben Ali and 
dissident artists at opposing loci, and placing a linear hierarchy between them, the (often 
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foreign) analysts ignore the breadth of power dynamics within the macro-hierarchy that 
they propose, within the media, as well as within the music industries.  
In light of the above it is important to ask, “How did the activist, music, and 
journalism fields intersect and influence developments during the recent 14 January 
Revolution?” By using Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus to explore capital 
and power dynamics (Bourdieu 1977, 1996, 1998) within the Tunisian music industry 
and artists as well as those who frame them in the news media with regard to the 
revolution, the relation of music to the regime becomes much more complex and nuanced 
than has been proposed. By collapsing a large category (hip-hop) into a label of 
“resistance,” analysts ignore the immense diversity of aims and views within the genre. 
This process of encapsulation of a musical genre into a narrowly defined category has 
many parallels with historical analyses of Algerian Raï music (Dolan, 2001), as does the 
contention/theme that a musical work can become an “anthem of the protestors.”1 
Further, because music, activism and media work in concert and often overlap in many 
larger arenas of social interaction, I will argue that the revolution itself became a field. It 
should therefore be noted that this project is not intended as a refutation of budding 
historical narratives of the 14 January Revolution, but rather an assertion of a more 
complicated web of actors who not only resisted, but also utilized, their surrounding 
social structures. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
                                                 
1 Bostic, Karl, “How Rap music fueled the Arab Spring uprisings,” NBC, September, 15, 2011. See Also: 
Skilbeck, Rod, “Mixing Pop and Politics: The Role of Rai in Algerian Political Discourse,” Australasian 
Middle East Studies Association Conference, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, September 22, 
1995. 
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In order to document the capital dynamics within any of the three fields outlined 
above, it is necessary to understand several underlying postulations of Bourdieu’s meta-
“theory of practices.” Central to Bourdieu’s theory, and an assumption embraced in the 
conceptual framework of this work, is the myth of a “disinterested act.” 2 By drawing on 
the work of Max Weber (specifically the symbolic capital dimensions of religion), and 
“rejecting the rational actor mode of conduct,” Bourdieu postulates that there is indeed 
symbolic, cultural, or material capital to be gained from any action.
3
 Although the capital 
to be gained varies according to the field(s) hosting the act, what emerges from this view 
of capital formulations is an entire economy of capital wherein specific types of capital 
may be exchanged for others according to the rules of the field.
4
 Further, certain 
exchanges of capital or even patterns of exchange may cause abrasion and conflict within 
a given field. For instance, in the art industry, and for my purposes the music industry, 
there is a ubiquitous tendency to label an artist who exchanges his/her cultural or 
symbolic capital for material capital as a “sell-out.” These same perceptions provoke a 
view that dichotomizes undesirable, heteronomous, and materially driven “mainstream” 
cultural productions from supposedly desirable, autonomous, authentic, and 
culturally/symbolically driven “underground” cultural productions. These dichotomizing 
processes, while important and fascinating, are specifically relational and (mostly) 
relevant to those who are more heavily invested in the music field. In order to objectify 
these social processes, and the relational component between agent and structure within a 
field, Bourdieu’s “sociology of symbolic interests” is indispensible and - for the purposes 
                                                 
2 Bourdieu, Pierre, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, Trans. Polity Press, Polity Press, (Stanford, 
CA: 1998) 
3 Ibid, see also: Swartz, David, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, University of 
Chicago Press, (Chicago, IL: 1997), pp. 66-67. 
4 The acceptable ratios of different capital accruement vary according to the particular field.  
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of this project - best allows the researcher to plot actor and structure in social space. It 
should also be noted that although Bourdieu uses the terms ‘field’ and ‘market’ 
interchangeably as an arena for competition, he stresses that to “think in terms of the field 
is to think relationally.”5 A field is also not an ‘institution,’ for it is based on the 
“confliction” property of social interactions, and therefore the boundaries and rules are 
not as firmly established as in an institution.
6
 However, because Bourdieu stresses that 
field is an open concept, it is difficult to articulate what is and is not a field in the 
Bourdieusian sense of the word, and qualification is open to interpretation. I will 
postulate that the recent Revolution (not just in Tunisia) is a field constituted by its own 
rules, capital, and activists networks spanning the range from orthodox to heterodox. 
Although it has a duration that has yet to be determined, this field is continually collapsed 
into a ‘universal.’  This aspect of my project however, ironically requires further 
exploration and development in order to satisfy the orthodoxy of Bourdieusian theory. 
Music, activism, and journalism are individual fields that host relevant capital 
transformations. Social actors exist in many fields simultaneously, and the 
aforementioned fields overlap, so it would be a fallacy to assume that capital relevant to 
one is not immediately relevant to the other. However, to objectify the above fields as 
well as the actors within them, it is necessary to describe more fully the type of capital(s) 
that drive the competition and legitimation functions in each. Further, in each field (and 
even in some areas of overlap) there exists a particular orthodoxy as well as heterodoxy 
relevant specifically to that field. A brief outline of the hypothesized capital goals and the 
specific orthodoxy-heterodoxy within each field is therefore necessary.  
                                                 
5 Swartz, David, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, pp. 199-120 
6 Ibid, pp. 120. 
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The music industry in its perceived bifurcation evinces both material and 
symbolic pursuit, resulting in not only the mainstream-underground dichotomy 
referenced above but also two (supposedly separate) capital markets. Record labels and 
producers are by their (business) nature materially driven, and most artists would not 
refuse money offered to them in exchange for their service. Yet, among the artists, and 
often when questioned in reference to their material motivations, there is a strong 
tendency to revert to the supposed pursuit of what Bourdieu referred to as the 
“universal,” the ‘goal for the sake of the goal,’ or in this case music for the sake of 
music.
7
 The artists thus claim symbolic motivations often in order to justify their material 
success. Just as nothing in history should be depicted as mono-causal, the myth of 
disinterestedness and even singular interest hinders description of motivations of a given 
actor and, thus, the most relevant and dominant capital(s) within a given field. However, 
because musicians and artists often cite symbolic motivations and the ‘universal’ as the 
reason and justification for their material successes, we may surmise that symbolic 
capital is the dominant and most legitimate form of capital within the music industry. The 
type of capital most legitimate in the music field is therefore significant specifically by 
virtue of its non-materialness. Therefore, cultural productions which appear to pursue the 
‘universal’ will bring a new artist into favor with the dominating orthodoxy (made up of 
critics, intellectuals, and consecrated autonomous musicians) of a given field, which 
simultaneously consecrates the cultural capital of the artists (making it symbolic) and 
reaffirming the symbolic capital of the aforementioned orthodoxy. A relegated 
‘heteronomous’ and perceivably material-driven musician will likely cause conflict 
within a field due to abrasion with the orthodoxy on account of his/her insufficient 
                                                 
7 Bourdieu, Pierre, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. 
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satisfaction of the myth of the ‘universal’ rite. Therefore, the non-material capital most 
highly valued within the music industry is obtainable by a convincing showcase of the 
pursuit of the universal along with what those in the field would laud as “good music.” 
As a result, this project therefore necessitates further exploration of desirable capital 
within the Tunisian music field and its marriage to the musicians who define it.   
An understanding of the journalist and activist fields is slightly more difficult than 
that of the music field. I hypothesize that additional research will show that the 
international news media constitutes an arena dominated by material capital as a 
legitimizing force. Bourdieu’s short book entitled On Television is particularly instructive 
in this regard.
8
 The orthodoxy within the international news media is necessarily dictated 
by material capital. Therefore I postulate that the heterodoxy within this particular field is 
comprised of alternative news sources whose lack of material capital and ‘experience’ 
translates to their supposed inability to vet facts before publication. However, the 
assumption that a large (often corporate) budget yields more accurate reporting will be 
explored in more detail below, and On Television is particularly helpful in deconstructing 
this widely-held assumption. Further, there is a large amount of symbolic capital to be 
gained in the journalist field; the preponderance of journalism awards stand testament to 
this fact. In any case, another interesting and unique dimension of the role of the news 
media is its ability to consecrate artists and activists to an international audience, thus 
constituting a legitimation function for actors outside its field-specific hierarchy. I 
propose that the use of polyglot and code-switching by artists evinces their awareness of 
this dynamic, which they use to spread their message, sell more products, and 
undoubtedly increase their capital.  
                                                 
8 Bourdieu, Pierre, On Television, The New Press, (New York, NY), 1998 
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If the journalistic field is dominated by material capital, the activist field on the 
other hand thrives strictly on symbolic and social capital. Stories, arrest histories and 
even scars serve as consecrated manifestations of non-material capital. Activism for 
material gain would therefore be seen as extremely distasteful and even despicable. Thus 
I hypothesize that social and symbolic capitals are the main legitimizing capital within 
the activism field. The significance of the diversity of capitals among the different fields, 
as well as their varying degrees of desirability in said fields, is that they evince the 
multiple capital-driven motivations of any given actor, as each exists within many 
different fields simultaneously. Therefore the postulation that the myth of 
disinterestedness may also be extended to the myth of singular interest is further 
bolstered.  
 
Methodology 
 
Using personal interviews conducted with artists, historical ethnomusicology 
studies from the region, as well as lyrics of the music in question, I examine  the state of 
Tunisian urban music at the beginning of 2011 as well as its relation to musical traditions 
and trends in the past decade. Further, I interpret the manifestations of competition and 
recognition through Bourdieusian concepts of capital. This thesis is the product of 
fieldwork conducted in 2011 and 2012 and will therefore draw on interviews with artists 
and other cultural figures as well as ethnographic data. The opinions collected during 
fieldwork help problematize the aforementioned Anthem of the Protestors theme as well 
as document the perceived role of artists and specifically musicians in the revolution. 
This aspect of the project will not only illustrate where the Tunisian populace situates 
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artists within social space relative to the revolution, art, and international news media, but 
it will also help reveal where the Tunisian populace situates itself. I will also be using 
online news articles from mid-November 2010 onward in order to illustrate and critique 
the ways that the international news media began and continue to frame certain artists. 
Doing so will also allow me to illustrate the condition and role of the journalism field 
during the revolution.  
 
Challenges 
 
The largest challenge to this study is the complete lack of well-researched 
scholarship on the topic of Tunisian cultural production during the 14 January 
Revolution. Further, due to the recent nature of the phenomenon to be analyzed, certain 
parallels will have to be drawn with existing scholarship on “protest music” from other 
countries and regions. Additionally, a comprehensive description of all the different 
fields involved in the 14 January Revolution is not only outside of the scope of this 
thesis, but likely outside of the realm of possibility as well. However, it is a fallacy to 
assume that fields exist in a vacuum. Therefore, in order to examine the effect of any 
single field during the Jasmine Revolution, it becomes necessary to show the 
multidimensional motivations of any single actor within said fields, thereby illustrating 
the multiple fields in which an actor may exist.  The resultant view of cultural production 
during the revolution will show that in addition to “resisting” the government of Ben Ali, 
all individuals (not just artists) simultaneously existed and competed within multiple 
legitimizing hierarchical structures. Therefore, the currently ubiquitous trend of searching 
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for historical causality in the recent wave of uprisings, in addition to resistors’ 
motivations, is an infinitely problematic process.  
A second challenge to my research is that it necessitates a focus on the period that 
most identify as the beginning of the protests marking the start of the 14 January 
Revolution. Yet a problematized timeline reveals that the “beginning” and “end” are at 
best blurry, and at worst debatable and even insignificant.
9
 In any case, it will be 
necessary to analyze the Tunisian musical and activist traditions up to a decade earlier in 
order to understand the significance of the trends in each field as well as trace the 
historical developments that led to 2011. 
One of the initial goals of this thesis was to survey segments of the Tunisian 
population in order to discover where they situated artists in terms of artist, activist, and 
revolutionary capital. In doing so, I had hoped to not only plot where artists existed 
within these fields but to compare it against the station assigned to them by the 
international news media. The logistics, costs, and challenges I encountered as a foreign 
researcher however, made conducting these surveys impractical (and unfortunately 
impossible) given my time restraints. The inability to plot artists in social space 
immediately following the uprising however, while disappointing, has left more room in 
this thesis for more qualitative aspects of artist-activist production as well as theoretical 
analyses.  
                                                 
9 It is interesting however, that the Tunisians mark the day Ben Ali (14 January) was deposed in the 
preferred nomenclature of the revolution, whereas Egyptians mark the day the protests began (25 January). 
This is curious, as the former uprising was seen to have produced a definitive result and positive change 
whereas at the time of this writing, many in the latter country still struggle to effect change upon the 
coercive and governmental apparati. Unfortunately however, a cognitive-linguistic exploration of 
revolutionary terminology is also outside of the scope of this paper. 
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By combining the above sources into a single analysis on the workings of non-
material capital, I believe that my project will help to fill gaps in existing scholarship on 
the 14 January Revolution and in English-language scholarship on Tunisia, as well as 
contribute to the vast repertoire of ethno-musicology. Further, this project asserts that the 
revolution itself constituted a field in the Bourdieusian sense in that it was an arena for 
capital competition. If successfully defended, it will be the first (to my knowledge) to 
assert that the “revolution(s)” simply hosted a network of capital exchange and self 
interests, and itself became a commodity in the process. Therefore, individuals who 
capitalized on the historic event, the commodification of nationalism in order to sell 
wares on the street, and even the commodification of the revolution in the international 
news media, were not only completely natural but essential parts of the event. Postulating 
that the ‘revolutions’ themselves are in ways constituted by commodification is 
undoubtedly controversial. I contend however, that such an approach divorces the event 
from retrojective universals such as nationalism and appreciates the multitude of (self) 
interests that drove the recent political developments in Tunisia. 
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II. OPPORTUNISTIC NATIONALISM 
 While the conceptual framework I have outlined is useful in analyzing the 
aforementioned fields, we must depart from Bourdieuist rhetoric and logic in order to 
review two critical concepts that (as we shall see) became ubiquitous in Tunisian music 
during, and immediately following, the 14 January Revolution: human rights and 
nationalism. These slippery concepts both imply engagement with a broad range of 
scholarship, yet I will engage them in limited fashion (in order not to lose focus) to 
explain their more challenging dimensions. The simultaneous use and distrust of human 
rights discourses inherent in the cultural products analyzed herein requires a more general 
exploration of the human rights concept in order to illustrate the underpinnings of both 
stances. The apparent explosion of nationalist discourses within recent Tunisian music 
also warrants further analysis. The increase in nationalist sentiment seems easily 
explained by the revolution, yet the (re)emergence of nationalism (as shown by the large 
corpus of scholarship on the concept) is more complex. Therefore, a treatment of limited 
and general scholarship and its relationship to Tunisian specificities is absolutely 
necessary. In order to bolster my argument and to situate it within the historical analysis 
of other celebrated discourses of dissidence, I turn to two other examples in the 
Mediterranean basin: Palestinian hip hop and Algerian Raï. 
People often state that music is a universal language. The language that any 
particular type of music employs, however, is indicative of the desires of a given artist. 
Artists, while both informed by culture and cultural informants to the society in which 
they exist, must territorially delineate the society they envision. When examining the use 
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of music in what has been called “resistance” and a more general political discourse, 
therefore, musicians must determine the segment of the population to which they wish to 
appeal, and which stressed identity will carry the greatest moral force for their arguments 
within a recognized power dynamic. Nationalism defines itself through spatial 
limitations, and is therefore both inclusive and exclusive. Nationalist approaches to 
political discourse often stress the specificity of issues and people within imagined spatial 
and cultural borders. Human rights approaches on the other hand are almost always used 
to mobilize the largest political base and identity imaginable (that of the human race) to 
support or decry a given law or practice. The potency of human rights approaches to 
political discourse is rooted in the universality of the appeal, and ideally, that no group 
can be excluded from participation in the discourse. Both concepts have been dissected 
and deconstructed by scholars for many years, and yet despite the academic problems 
with human rights and nationalism, both concepts continue to be powerful tools in 
mobilizing and disseminating ideas. 
My understanding of nationalism, like most in the social science community, has 
been very much influenced by the landmark work of Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism.
10
 Given that this 
project focuses on a discourse of dissidence, the above work is even more significant, as 
Anderson himself states very early on that, “since World War II every successful 
revolution has defined itself in national terms,” and “nation-ness is the most universally 
legitimate value in the political life of our time.”11 The potency of nationalism as a tool 
for cultural and political commentary, support, and criticism is therefore well understood. 
                                                 
10 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 
Verso Publishers, (New York, NY: 1983). 
11 Ibid, pp. 2, 3. 
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Also, the fact that much of Tunisian and Palestinian hip-hop, in addition to a large 
portion of Algerian Raï is most often sung in the local colloquial should not come as a 
surprise for anyone who has read Anderson’s book, as the use of a single vernacular in a 
given area being paramount, according to Anderson, in the formation of national 
identity.
12
  
The problem with applying Anderson’s theory is that he is speaking specifically 
to the use of written vernaculars (in Europe) in the formation of nationalism, whereas 
within the MENA region, Modern Standard Arabic has typically been the written 
language of nationalism. There exists a large debate on this facet of Anderson’s theory 
when applied to the so-called ‘Arab world,’ however; the focus of this thesis is of course 
on those tenets of nationalism which are orally and electronically transmitted, and thus 
not written.
13
 
Spoken vernacular, just like nationalism, is not static. Tunisian hip-hop artists and 
Algerian Raï artists often use French (as well as other languages) in their music, and in so 
doing they highlight a past of colonial domination in the collective memory while 
simultaneously expanding the comprehensibility of their music to second-generation 
members of the Maghreb diaspora living in France (or elsewhere) who may be unable to 
completely understand derja. Polyglot usage and code-switching therefore expands the 
inclusiveness of a given nationalism, while at the same time pointing out the diversity of 
the imagined nation. 
                                                 
12 Ibid, pp. 37-48 
13 An in-depth analysis of Tunisian print-nationalism would certainly be interesting as most of the country 
is bilingual and French language print-nationalism has been present in Tunisia in the past. For a more 
expansive critique of Anderson’s theory in relation to the MENA region, see: Fahmy, Ziad, Ordinary 
Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture, Stanford University Press, (Stanford, 
CA: 2011), pp. 11-17 
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Anderson also credits the rise of print-capitalism with the expansion of not only a 
singular vernacular, but also by transitive property, nationalism itself.
14
 The spread of 
print-capitalism (books, and more importantly newspapers) required of those wishing to 
participate directly both literacy and coin to pay for literature. Of course, those without 
money could always borrow, and the illiterate can always listen to someone else read the 
material. Music, on the other hand, is comprehensible to any who can speak the language 
in which the song is written, and the messages contained therein are therefore accessible 
to a larger portion of the population. Also, while print capitalism persists, most any song 
one might want to access is available online and internet access for a fee is becoming 
evermore widespread. This new web-capitalism (often dependent on advertising 
revenues) offers a faster alternative to the dissemination of ideas than that of print-
capitalism. A simple and seemingly obvious observation to be sure, but when paired with 
Anderson’s observation on the role of print-capitalism in creating and spreading national 
awareness, the efficiency of information dissemination allows nationalisms to be 
redefined by a larger section of society, and over a much shorter period. Anderson also 
paraphrases the work of John Dalberg-Acton by saying that “exile is the nursery of 
nationality.”15 Anderson expands on this by stating that the internet and improvements in 
communications only exacerbate this “exile.”16 Thus, a French-Tunisian while perhaps 
unable to travel to Tunisia, may be transported to those physical and cognitive spaces in 
which Tunisian nationalism is reproduced, on the internet, and potentially in a multitude 
of languages.   
                                                 
14 Ibid,. 
15 Dalberg-Acton, John. Cited in: Anderson, Benedict, “Exodus,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 
1994, pp. 315 
16 Anderson, Benedict, “Exodus,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 322 
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In Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Gellner elucidates beautifully the relationship 
between socio-political tensions and language relative to nationalism:  
Industrialization engenders a mobile and culturally homogenous society, one which 
consequently has egalitarian expectations and aspirations… [a]t the same time, in its 
early stages, industrial society also engenders a very sharp and painful and conspicuous 
inequality, all the more painful because accompanied by great disturbance, and because 
those less advantageously placed, in that period, tend to be not only relatively, but also 
absolutely miserable. In that situation… latent political tension is acute, and becomes 
actual if it can seize on good symbols… Characteristically it may seize on language… 
[and] is very strongly impelled in this direction by the fact that in industrializing societies 
communication and hence culture assumes a new and unprecedented importance.17 
 
Anderson’s work argues that culture must be made homogenous, through language (as 
well as other means) in forming nationalisms, while Gellner adds that this homogeneity 
spurs a longing for equitable treatment which will manifest itself if given the proper 
stimuli. The above references to egalitarianism do not necessarily apply to finance and 
distribution of wealth, but could refer to institutionalized mistreatment or discrimination. 
Both Anderson and Gellner stress the importance of language not only in creating and 
defining nationalisms, but also in continually redefining them as well as questioning the 
status quo of a given national reality. Put simply, social and political commentary 
(whether it be dissidence or support) necessitates ideas, ideas necessitate a means of 
communication, and in this case the means of conveyance is Tunisian music and its 
lyrics.  
 E. J. Hobsbawm adds a cautionary note to Gellner’s articulation of egalitarian  
nationalism by emphasizing the demands of loyalty, that “nationalism” means, 
“’primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent’… [and] overrides all other public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as 
                                                 
17 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishing (Oxford, UK: 1983), pp. 72. 
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wars) all other obligations of any kind.”18 This view is certainly compatible with 
Anderson’s contention that all revolutions since World War II have needed nationalism, 
and so again, mobilization of resistance, dissidence, support, or outright conformity along 
nationalistic lines is not altogether supprising if we are to accept the primacy of national 
identification. 
Nationalism and dissidence are therefore natural partners. It seems in keeping 
with Anderson’s contention about nationalism and revolution, that it was natural for 
Tunisian cultural producers to use nationalist discourses and symbols when 
advantageous. Still, the question remains: what made nationalistic arguments so prevalent 
during the period surrounding January 14, and why were they not manifest earlier, before 
the revolution?  A complete exploration of this particular question and an articulation of 
the nationalist field in Tunisia is unfortunately outside of the scope of this project. 
Additionally, I do not mean to essentialize “nationalism,” but rather, to look at instances 
wherein nationalist discourses are deployed or emphasized, and in contrast, rejected or 
downplayed. However, the revitalization of the Tunisian nationalist field appears to have 
opened up an arena wherein nationalism was once again perceived as legitimate whereas 
Ben Ali, while holding a monopoly on nationalist discourse seemed to have paralyzed the 
nationalism field; it was not perceived as a legitimate pursuit alone but a means to 
achieving some other end such as wealth accumulation, political power, or the awarding 
of contracts, just to name a few. While this dynamic surely persists in mutated form, it is 
seen as more legitimate and singularly interested; the other interests at stake are more 
blurred and people are more apt to trust the nationalism of a given agent, which 
                                                 
18 Hobsbawm, E. J., Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge 
University Press, (New York, NY: 1990) pp. 9 
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encourages individuals to compete within the nationalist field. What is certain however, 
is that a common print vernacular was not soley responsible for the revitalization of 
nationalism in Tunisia. Also, despite the contentions of Anderson and Gellner, Tunisia is 
not necessarily homogenous (despite being 98% Muslim
19
), but an impasse occurred 
wherein, to use Gellner’s own words, it was simply advantageous to “seize” upon these 
“symbols.” However, nationalistic principles were not the only vectors of contestation 
and mobilization; the use of human rights concepts in attempts at mobilization was also 
quite prevalent.  
                                                 
19 Although this number does not take into account the number of atheists, agnostics, ect. For statistic, see; 
CIA World Fact Book, “Tunisia: People and Society,” Updated February 15, 2012: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html#People 
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ABOVE AND BELOW 
Human rights legislation is of course saturated with problems and contradictions, 
and yet the human rights concept can be very useful in mobilizing popular support for a 
given cause. Maha Abdelrahman and others have correctly pointed out that human rights 
legislation is largely dependent on the government of a particular state for its 
implementation.
20
 Amnesty International even states on its website that “International 
campaigning and mass mobilization are often central to building legitimacy and 
convincing governments to take action on human rights issues.”21 Governments are thus 
perceived as central to the successful implementation of human rights reforms. The 
mention of “mass mobilization,” however, refers primarily to international support for a 
more general and broadly defined human rights concept that includes microfinance, 
restrictions on arms trade, and landmines reduction.
22
 The implementation of human 
rights reforms depends in large part on the state or government, and human rights abuses, 
even those perpetrated by non-state actors, are generally seen as a governmental failure. 
As a result, when people appeal a universal right, they direct their calls to national 
officials. The paradox is clarified when the government is itself seen to be directly 
responsible for a given human rights abuse.  
Unfortunately, there exists a dearth in literature on human rights-oriented 
mobilization relative to nationalism. Yet, to anyone familiar with the recent revolutions in 
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, or Syria it is impossible to ignore the role of human rights 
                                                 
20 Abdelrahman, Maha, “The Nationalization of the Human Rights Debate in Egypt,” Nations and 
Nationalism, 13(2), 2007, 285-300, accessed April 25, 2011: 
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22 Ibid. 
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as a tool for mobilization. Further, most anti-colonial actions of the twentieth century 
appealed to universal human rights. The very term “human rights” implies a degree of 
universality, suggesting that these rights are something that all should enjoy. Yet, 
comprehensively defining and delineating what rights should be universal is problematic. 
That is why defining a right as a universal is most effective in mobilizing a given 
populace after a particular violation; it is then that the universality of that right appears 
most convincing and compelling.
23
  
Human rights concepts recur continually in Tunisian cultural productions around 
14 January, but rather than serving only as a tool for those who oppose oppressive 
regimes, human rights arguments have also been used to frame violent interventions.
24
 
One of the problems with human rights is its potential use as an excuse for international 
intervention, coercion, and imperialism. Importantly, concepts of human rights was not 
just a tool of protestors in mobilizing and constructing their arguments but has often been 
a rhetorical justification for government initiatives to ‘free’ women from the ‘oppression’ 
of their own societies. It is no surprise then that many Tunisian artists call into question 
or even satirize the human rights concept. 
Democratic states are responsible for grave human rights abuses as well. Consider 
a case that Talal Asad highlighted during the UN intervention in Somalia: the US carried 
out a bombing campaign which completely destroyed entire city blocks, and caused 
                                                 
23 The above statement by Gellner points to egalitarianism that is not necessarily financial; this is 
interesting because egalitarianism implies the same degree of universality as does the human rights 
concept. 
24 From the French colonization of Algeria, to the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the liberation 
and protection of women framed as a human rights imperative has been an ubiquitous feature of 
legitimizing discourses. 
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untold civilian casualties and yet never held a public inquiry on it.
25
 The well known 
scandal at Abu Ghraib and the continued use of extraordinary renditions further 
demonstrate that democracies do not uphold human rights across the board, despite oft-
cited commitments to upholding certain universal rights. In his book, Rejecting Rights, 
Sonu Bedi postulates that just as authoritarian governments may allow their citizens 
certain rights, democracies often limit the rights of their citizenry. Bedi then claims that 
“the scope of liberty is ‘logically distinct’ from democracy.”26 It is clear, therefore, that 
democracy is not a complete panacea for human rights abuses. 
A government’s concern regarding to the human rights abuses of another country 
is always situated within unequal dynamics of power. Foreign governments that see it as 
their duty, as Talal Asad put it, to “redeem” the victimized,27 have also in the past used 
human rights in order to justify an imperialist project. For example: beginning in the 
1930s, French officials in Algeria started to design their policies to target women, and 
their perceived status as evinced by the veil, in order to “liberate them” and in doing so 
convince half of the population of the moral superiority of French culture.
28
 The Judeo-
Christian “redemption” model was employed in the case of Algeria in order to “civilize” 
the local population but ironically failed to account for the agency that Algerian women 
did possess, and the large role they would play in colonial resistance.
29
  
Beyond the messages contained within works of political contestation, an 
interesting shared feature of Raï as well as Tunisian and Palestinian urban music is the 
                                                 
25 Asad, Talal, “What Do Human Rights Do? An Anthropological Inquiry,” Theory and Event, 4:4, 2000, 
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27 Asad, Talal, “What Do Human Rights Do? An Anthropological Inquiry,” pp. 25-27 
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degree of “freedom” musicians enjoy in dissemination of their respective media. In his 
article entitled, “Alternative Alternatives: Free Media, Dissent, and Emergent Activist 
Networks,” Ted M Coopman has outlined what we he terms “free media:” 
There are three major attributes of what constitutes free media… freedom from/rejection 
of governmental regulation; freedom from/rejection of commercial or traditional funding 
constraints; and freedom from/rejection of organizational constraints.30…Funding is 
arguably the biggest hurdle facing alternative or radical media.31 
 
According to this definition, Raï, Tunisian, and Palestinian music have all at some point 
in their history enjoyed a certain amount of freedom. Grassroots hip-hop, for example, 
can be produced on a simple laptop and uploaded to the internet almost immediately. As 
of December 2009, 3.5 million Tunisians have access to the internet, out of a population 
that was roughly 10.5 million in 2009.
32
 The internet is a very important means of 
dissemination in Tunisia, and internet penetration has only increased during the two and a 
half years since the above statistics were collected. In addition, because adult literacy in 
Tunisia is quite high, “surfing” the internet is quite easy. At the time of this writing, the 
internet is only beginning to be regulated by states, no funding is necessary to upload 
your media to popular sites such as YouTube, and the only organizational constraint 
facing uploaded media is potential censorship of graphic material. Even then, many sites 
host completely uncensored “raw” material no matter how graphic.  
Certain conceptualizations and projections of hip hop and its unregulated 
dissemination argue that lack of control is actually a detriment to the supposedly 
monolithic, essentialized nature of hip hop. Carlton A. Usher in his book, A Rhyme is a 
                                                 
30 Coopman, Ted M., “Alternative Alternatives: Free Media, Dissent, and Emergent Activist Networks,” 
Representing Resistance: Media, Civil Disobedience, and the Global Justice Movement, ed. Opel, Andy, 
and Pompper, Donnalyn, Praeger Publishers (Westport, USA: 2003), pp. 198  
31 Ibid, pp. 200 
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Terrible Thing to Waste: Hip-hop and the Creation of a Political Philosophy, argue that 
lack of censorship of the hip-hop industry negatively impacts the dissemination of a 
political message: “[Hip-hop Culture’s] failure to self-govern and chastise elements that 
undermine its political agenda will continue to derail any serious attempts at advancing 
its interests.”33 I disagree on a number of points. The lack of any governance, as we shall 
see, expands the potential of a political message, and simultaneously removes any 
organizational or fiscal restraints that might hinder that message. It is also quite apparent 
that there is no “industry” of so called “grassroots” hip-hop, in that it is diffuse and often 
spontaneous. Also, given the diverse interests represented by the many forms and flavors 
of hip-hop, it would be a mistake to presume there is one unified political agenda. Mike 
Moore claims: “Hip hop places a microphone in the hands of marginalized members of 
society…”34 This contention results in a romanticized view of hip hop as primarily a 
vehicle of political commentary (issuing from the dominated) while ignoring the 
differences, competitions, and internal contestations (of field orthodoxy) inherent in the 
hip hop musical field. The articulation of a hip hop “counterpublic” similarly 
essentializes hip hop discourses via their confliction with the public sphere, and again, 
discounts competition and contestation within the field of cultural production. Achille 
Mbembe states that:  
[I]n order to account for both the mind-set and the effectiveness of postcolonial relations 
of power, we need to go beyond the binary categories used in standard interpretations of 
domination, such as resistance v. passivity, autonomy v. subjection, state v. civil society, 
hegemony v. counter-hegemony, totalisation v. detotalisation.35 
 
                                                 
33 Usher, Carlton A, A Rhyme is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Hip-hop and the Creation of a Political 
Philosophy, Africa World Press (Trenton, USA: 2006), pp. 131 
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Mbembe rightly points out that any introduction of binary discourses or modes of 
power such as government/resitance, or public/counterpublic “are not helpful… 
[and] cloud our understanding  of postcolonial relations.
36
 Mbembe further 
contends that:  
 
[It is] wrong […] to continue to interpret postcolonial relationships in terms of resistance 
or absolute domination, or as a function of the binary oppositions usually adduced in 
conventional analyses of movements of indiscipline and revolt (e.g. counter-discourse, 
counter-society, counterhegemony, 'the second society', etc).37 
 
The differences assumed between ‘publics’ or nodes of power relations also 
obscure a multitude of processes both initiated within, and imposed on, a given field of 
cultural production. Raï for instance, has faced excessive governmental regulation, and 
for half a century or more it has been part of an organized musical industry. It is ironic, 
however, that this same regulation has allowed Raï musicians to be more explicit and 
controversial in their viewpoints. Joan Gross, David McMurray, and Ted Swedenburg 
postulate in their article, “Arab Noise and Ramadan Nights: Raï, Rap, and Franco-
Maghrebi Identity,” that as sales of audio cassettes grew rapidly, producers insisted that 
their artists employ increasingly risqué lyrics.
38
 The Algerian state viewed the spread of 
cassettes as such a threat to the ban on the distribution of Raï music that it even attempted 
to ban the import of cassette tapes into Algeria.
39
 The cassette tape, however, could not 
be contained, and Raï’s status as contraband thus aided musicians in their pursuit of 
artistic freedom by consecrating their efforts in the Algerian activist field. Wide-scale 
                                                 
36 Ibid, pp. 3 
37 Ibid, pp. 5 
38 Gross, Joan, McMurray David, and Swedenburg, Ted, “Arab Noise and Ramadan Nights: Rai, Rap, and 
Franco-Maghrebi Identity,” Diaspora 3, no. 1 (1994), pp. 202. 
39Noor Al-Deen, Hana, “The Evolution of Rai Music,” Journal of Black Studies, Sage Publications: 2005, 
No. 35, pp. 605.  
 29 
availability, according to Noor al-Deen Hana in her article “The Evolution of Raï Music,” 
forced the government’s hand: “The popularity of this music was felt so strongly in 
Algeria that the government was forced to acknowledge this genre of music and to lift 
some of the earlier restrictions that were imposed on Raï music.”40 Rod Skilbeck has 
suggested that lifting the ban on Raï originated in the continued belief that it was a 
western art form and could function as a powerful tool in combating the spread of Islamic 
extremism.
41
 Skilbeck suggests that this tactic is not without precedent, as the Soviets 
used western rock in central Asia for the same purpose.
42
 By delineating the west and 
Islam into discrete entities, therefore, music was perceived as a weapon to proactively 
produce epistemic violence to combat essentialized social norms in a target population. 
The use of music against religious thinking constitutes epistemic violence par excellence 
as it was used to challenge supposed wide-spread doxa, and presumably, condition the 
population to better tolerate the state.     
 Most accounts of Raï music trace its origins to political resistance against colonial 
domination and thus ascribe it to a category of resistance music. In contrast, I argue that 
calling Raï (or any other musical genre) a music of continual resistance is not completely 
accurate, as it is a very large and broad genre of music. If one were to identify a general 
undercurrent in Raï, it would be the continual redefining and reconstituting of Algerian 
nationalism. The reconstitution of nationalism argument, in my opinion, is more 
academically responsible than simply labeling Raï as resistance.  
In the mid-1980s Raï became so popular that the Algerian state could no longer 
ignore its influence and at this time sensed an opportunity to co-opt Raï musical influence 
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into the national agenda; the state-run radio service subsequently edited and infused lyrics 
with nationalistic messages.
43
 Gross, McMuray and Swedenburg highlight one particular 
example: “A line originally sung by several Chebs as ‘we made love in a broken-down 
shack’ was broadcast on Algerian radio as ‘we did our military service in a broken-down 
shack.’”44 This co-opting of Raï into the state agenda is one of many examples of 
nationalism redefined throughout Raï’s history: at first nationalism that was anti-colonial, 
later defining itself in opposition to Islamist elements within Algerian society, and later 
still, being effectively co-opted to serve the national government’s interests.  
 Palestinian hip-hop has been well documented in the academic community, as 
well as the film industry. Nasser al-Taee’s "Voices of Peace and the Legacy of 
Reconciliation: Popular Music, Nationalism, and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East,” 
highlights past and present nationalist undertones and messages in Palestinian music.
45
 
Still, the dominant trend in analyzing the Palestinian hip-hip at present is to highlight 
examples of artists calling for increased cooperation between Israel and Palestine, 
Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation, or Palestinian appeals for ratified statehood. 
The prevalent yet diverse themes of resistance, nationalism, or cooperation, highlighted 
by analysts, are evidence that the message in Palestinian hip hop is not always one of 
subversion.   
 Examining human rights and nationalism based arguments in the variations of 
music listed above allows us to understand only a few of the dimensions of these musical 
genres. Both arguments can mobilize large segments of the population, and indeed might 
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be among the most effective (non-religious) mobilizing techniques. By examining the 
aforementioned musical categories, I hoped to examine the role of music in resistance 
and/or political discourse while displaying the ubiquitous use of nationalism and human 
rights based arguments in said discourse. Still, it became clear that calling the music 
simply “resistance” might imply that it is, at heart, simply a reaction to the status quo. 
This music however, does not only refute an old image, but also proposes a new one. 
In addition to betraying the very fluid nature of both the music and the categories 
themselves, labeling any of these genres as “resistance” or “subversive” is a myopic 
interpretation that is unfortunately employed by many commentators on the subject. It is 
impossible for one to speak accurately of any genre of music (even one so laden with 
socio-political commentary) in such a generalization. Unfortunately this mistake is 
ubiquitous especially when speaking of hip-hop. It has been often argued that hip-hop is a 
subversive (or “resistance”) genre,46 which arose out of dissatisfaction with socio-
economic conditions in which the artists lived. This contention wholly ignores the actual 
value of hip-hop and music in general: it is malleable and can be adapted to any specific 
purpose, characteristics that this thesis aims to illustrate in detail. For example, those who 
encapsulate hip-hop in a narrowly defined category might be surprised to learn of the 
2006 hip-hop opera (“hip-hopera”) based on the life of Muammar Gaddafi, produced by 
the English National Opera company (ENO) and performed in the United Kingdom.
47
  
It may be easier to categorize a musical genre when looking at a specific point in 
its history, but even then, complications arise. For instance, throughout its history Raï has 
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been a vehicle for many arguments: anti-colonialism, anti-government (post 
independence), pro-government, anti-Islamist, pro-Algerian, anti-debauchery, and even 
pro-debauchery (drinking and fornicating). Palestinian hip-hop is no different, as 
different works and different artists over the years have made arguments ranging from 
pro-collaboration (with Israel), to anti-colonialism, nationalism, anti-violence and anti-
drug use. The above categories are as diffuse and fluid as the works they supposedly 
encapsulate. In addition, both of these genres at any precise moment have claimed a 
multitude of the above themes, often in the same works.  
If one is attempting to generalize, it would be more accurate to analyze a single 
work in order to find dominant themes within it. For example, examine the following 
(translated) lyrics of Cheb Khaled’s Wahran Wahran: “Oran! Oran! You've lost/ many 
great citizens/ emigrated from you/ they dwelt in exile confused/ and exile is hard and 
traitorous.”48 In this work, Khaled is simply lamenting the diaspora  and Algeria’s 
turbulent political landscape, rather than posing a fundamental challenge to authority. 
How can this song be classified within the ‘resistance’ genre?49  
It is true that much Raï openly challenged government and cultural norms. More 
than four decades ago, Cheikha Rimitti was openly performing lyrics such as, “when he 
embraces me, he pricks me like a snake,”50 and in another Rimitti states that, “people 
adore God, I adore beer.”51 In her article entitled “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing 
Transformations of Power Through Bedouin Women,” Lila Abu-Lughod at one point is 
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elucidating on a specific kind of Bedouin poetry, as she states that, “people’s opinions 
that this type of poetry was risqué and un-Islamic, suggested their uneasy recognition of 
the subversiveness of the genre.”52 She goes on to state that in the house where she lived, 
however, “poetry was cherished.”53 Likewise, Raï may have been viewed as a subversive 
genre but has attained a “cherished” station in Algerian society. 
The lyrics of Cheikha Rimmiti’s songs showcased above most surely were 
perceived as risqué, like the Bedouin poetry mentioned by Abu-Lughod. It is certainly 
true that many perceive Algerian Raï as a similar “subversive genre” due to a high 
number of popular works which have openly challenged authorities (colonial authorities, 
post-colonial authorities, Islamists). Nevertheless, many works within the genre are 
merely formulations of existential commentary.  
Palestinian hip-hop is also expresses diverse political and social messages. In their 
song “A Stranger in My Own Country,” the Palestinian hip-hop group DAM state, “We 
encounter faces that don't want us, looks full of disgust, whispers full of swearing, just 
wishing to expel us. What? Did you forget who made the foundations for these 
buildings?”54 While the above lyrics certainly challenge openly what the artists perceive 
as injustices and invoke the themes of nationalism and human rights, again, to collapse 
the genre to one entirely of resistance would ignore projects such as the Sulha Peace 
Project in which Arab and Israeli hip-hop artists performed together.
55
 Although DAM 
was not in attendance at the Sulha Peace Project, they have attempted to collaborate with 
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Israeli artists in the past; most notably Y-Love, who performs in the attire of an Orthodox 
Jew. Perhaps one would label mutual recognition a form of resistance, but in the words of 
Amelia Thomas, “[t]he message of their music isn't always political.”56 It is clear that 
labeling a genre as anything forces one to overlook any evidence that would refute that 
label. Yet, individual songs can be interpreted more easily as it is more difficult to 
generalize about them. 
Although there is virtually no academic work on Tunisian music produced during 
the 2011 revolution at the time of this writing, Aljazeera and other news agencies have 
highlighted specific examples of hip-hop artists using their work as political activism 
during the revolution. A look at the work of a Tunisian rapper named El Général properly 
illustrates that the increasing potential for accuracy of descriptive labels runs concurrent 
with collapsing scope. His song Rayes Lebled (“President of the Country”)  was released 
on November 7, 2010 (the twenty-third anniversary of former president Ben Ali’s 
takeover and approximately one month before the “start” of the 14 January Revolution). 
The danger of generalizing with regards to theme and motivation is less present in an 
individual work than with an entire genre. For example, if the reader examines the lyrics 
present in Rayes Lebled and bears in mind the time at which it was released, the political 
nature of the song cannot be overlooked. Consider the refrain for instance: 
Mr. President your people are dead. Many people eat from the garbage and you see what 
is happening in the country; misery everywhere. People have not found a place to sleep. I 
am speaking to you now in the name of the people who are suffering and were put under-
foot. 57 
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He goes on to criticize the country’s institutions: “The law of the Constitution, put it in 
water and drink it.”58 El Général also criticizes what he calls a “direct robbery that 
dominated the country by force. Not to name any names, everyone knows who they 
are.”59 It is quite certain that with the above line, El Général is referring to the widespread 
sentiment that Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Trabelsi, and her family were spending the country’s 
wealth as their own. Their rapacious greed as well as the Tunisian citizenry’s knowledge 
of it, continued until the end; French intelligence officials claim that Trabelsi had left 
with 1.5 tonnes of gold bars when she and her husband fled the country, supporting local 
rumors.
60
 
El Général also claims the right(s) to eat, work, and express political opinions: 
“There are still people dying on the street who want to work to survive but their voice 
was not heard… Where is the right of expression? They are only words.”61 El Général 
was promptly arrested by Tunisian police shortly after the release of this song, which 
further supported his assertion that the Tunisian people had no freedom of expression. 
However, to label El Général’s speech acts (or indeed, anyone else’s) simply as 
“resistance” or “acts of resistance” would posit a binary division between state and 
populace while overlooking the breadth of power dynamics informing, and being utilized 
by, dissident groups.  
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IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF RESISTANCE 
In “Rayes Lebled,” El Général makes it clear that his lyrics were a message to 
then-President Ben Ali. The themes elicited ranged from poverty to the horrors of 
rapacious kleptocracy and were directed at the chief authority figure within Tunisia. 
However, any study outlining the use of subversive action propelled by nationalism(s), 
human rights, or other motives should pay special attention to power dynamics, their 
effect on formulating the self, and transitively the subversive subject in question. 
Consider Saba Mahmood’s bridging of Michel Foucault with Judith Butler in order to 
articulate the relation between power, resistance, and identity: 
Power… can not be understood solely on the model of domination as something 
possessed and deployed by individuals or sovereign agents over others, with a singular 
intentionality, structure, or location that presides over its rationality and execution… 
power is to be understood as a strategic relation of force that permeates life and is 
productive of new forms of desires, objects, relations, and discourses. Central to his 
formulation is what Foucault calls the paradox of subjectivation: the very process and 
conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also the means by which she [/he] 
becomes a self-conscious identity and agent.62 
 
I would add that the power structure in which a form of “resistance” can be located is 
always multifaceted, which further complicates the notion of resistance. One therefore 
cannot examine resistance in all of its forms outside the context of forms of power that 
intimately permeate the lives of everyone involved in the dynamic. Abu-Lughod observes 
that there is a tendency to interpret “all forms of resistance as signs of the ineffectiveness 
of systems of power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal 
to be dominated.”63 The problem of an observer interpreting resistance in this way, 
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according to Abu-Lughod, is that “we collapse distinctions between forms of resistance 
and foreclose certain questions about the workings of power.”64 Foucault stated: “Where 
there is power there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequentially, this resistance is 
never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”65 Therefore any type of resistance 
should be analyzed within its power dynamic to understand what is being resisted. As 
Abu-Lughod phrased Foucault’s postulation: “Power is something that works not just 
negatively, by denying, restricting, prohibiting, or repressing, but also positively, by 
producing forms of pleasure, systems of knowledge, goods, and discourses.”66 Therefore, 
it is natural for “resistors” to attempt to gain advantage through parts of the established 
power dynamic while challenging other segments. In his 1849 treatise, On the Duty of 
Civil Disobedience, which has shaped ideas of nonviolent resistance, Henry David 
Thoreau wrote: “In fact, I quietly declare war with the state, after my fashion, though I 
will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can, as is usual in such cases.”67 
It is possible to challenge one section of an existing power dynamic while simultaneously 
ignoring or taking advantage of other segments with in the same matrix. 
 At any given time one can resist a singular and unitary power structure, while 
subverting several others simultaneously. Multiple power structures rely and reflect on 
each other as in a hall of mirrors. If an individual takes a book in a public library (funded 
and maintained by the state) and, rather than check it out, hides it in the library so that it 
would be accessible only to them, is the individual in question resisting the state, the 
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library, the catalogue system, the structure of late fees and process, or morality in 
general? All of these structures exist within a singular state power structure, but the 
authority that the book-hider intended to undermine would still be impossible to discern 
without questioning him or her closely. Concluding such an act is a violation of state 
power simply because all of these structures exist within the umbrella of state would 
reduce the intended and resulting forms of resistance. Abu-Lughod postulates, “[s]ince 
the moral code is one of the most important means of perpetuating the unequal structures 
of power, then violations of this code must be understood as ways of resisting the system 
and challenging the authority of those who represent and benefit from it.”68 How then 
would this type of resistance be applied to the aforementioned case of ousted President 
Ben Ali and his wife absconding from Tunisia with a portion of the country’s sovereign 
wealth? Is it possible to label their opportunism as “resistance?” It is true that they 
resisted the moral force of the Tunisian populace’s wishes, but it is absurd that we 
employ the same word to describe the actions of individuals such as Maikel Nabil who 
was arrested in Egypt for criticizing the military after former President Hosni Mubarak 
was deposed.
69
 The word ‘resistance’ therefore reveals itself as insufficient to explain the 
diverse actions of individuals acting outside of commonly accepted norms or hierarchies.   
The problem with the notion of resistance is that power is diffuse and 
resistance(s) atomized. In the above analogy, the person who hid the book in order to 
maintain prolonged although limited possession of it did not necessarily want to 
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challenge the state, but rather a more localized power structure. If we disregard the 
actor’s motives because the state has permeated the power structure and ultimately 
formed the agent, the actor may be perceived as challenging the state in a minor way. 
However, because the state depends on institutions such as a subsidized public library to 
permeate the daily life of its subjects, a given institution may seem like a singular and 
discrete power matrix to a given actor in a seemingly one-dimensional interaction.  There 
exist both simultaneity and symbiosis between the different “mirrors” (to continue the 
analogy) that make up the singular power matrix. As Abu-Lughod puts it:  
[d]espite the considerable theoretical sophistication of many studies of resistance… 
because they are ultimately more concerned with finding resistors and explaining 
resistance than with examining power, they do not explore as fully as they might the 
implications of the forms of resistance they locate.70  
 
Due to the amorphous and slippery nature of the term “resistance,” therefore, for my 
purposes of analyzing different politically charged musical lyrics, it is more useful to 
understand them as operating in a localized context that can be perceived within a vast 
cultural array of (sometimes illicit) open political expression(s). It may also be helpful 
here to consider the power of a vast array of cultural products in shaping political 
discourse, and ultimately helping to define political issues as well as the 
observers/participants who will define themselves in relation to those issues. For this 
reason, I have made an effort in this thesis to outline themes of ‘political contestation’ 
rather than ‘resistance’ in order to highlight continually the multitude of poles and not fall 
into the simplified binary division between individual and state.    
 Upon beginning this project my principal goal was to determine whether the 
political statements in Tunisian hip-hop and other forms of music would qualify as 
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resistance, and if so, what their effect was on the general populace. I have concluded that 
the question of “resistance” is itself irrelevant. Within these musical works, the intent, 
capacity for mobilization, and effect of the political statements are more important than 
glorifying an entity or person for resisting. More important than the classification of the 
works or genres listed in this thesis is the effect that those works have had on the political 
landscape. The aforementioned works have repeatedly invoked the themes of human 
rights and nationalism (among others), but their result (without the problematic(s) of 
resistance) continues to be understudied by those who comment and research on Raï, hip 
hop, and other musical genres. Most importantly, in labeling a musical genre simply 
“resistance” the observer separates the cultural product from the governing dynamic, 
placing the subject before power and making it an object of study devoid of socio-
political and historical context. Resistance and government are not the lone dichotomy 
obscuring interpretations of music, government, politics, and how they intersect. A look 
at the dichotomy between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity,’ beginning with their function in 
the historical Tunisian music field, and later in post-independence government policy, 
therefore becomes necessary.  
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 V. TUNISIAN HISTORY AND MUSICAL ‘TRADITION’ 
In 1888, Rodolphe d'Erlanger arrived in Tunisia and began what would become a 
life-long affiliation with the village of Sidi Bou Said.
71
 Even the age of sixteen, 
d’Erlanger knew that he was only beginning a career that would define both him and 
Tunisian culture.
72
 The contemporary accounts of d’Erlanger’s enchantment with 
Tunisia, his contributions to Tunisian cultural production, as well as his diverse body of 
work detailing and even promoting Tunisian ‘traditional’ music, often frame his presence 
in Tunisia in a favorable light. His efforts to preserve the ‘traditional’ within Tunisian 
culture represents a growing trend within Tunisian society that not only continued, but 
intensified to this day: the perceived encroachment of the “modern” on the “traditional” 
and those who either celebrate or denounce it. 
Returning to Tunisia two decades later as an educated “Baron,” d’Erlanger was by 
then well-known for his paintings as well as work on Arab musicology.
73
 Throughout his 
career, Baron d’Erlanger published six volumes chronicling Tunisian and “Arab” musical 
styles, most notably Ma’luf and Stenballi, and he was integral in the sending of 
“traditional” musicians from Tunisia to the first International Congress of Arab Music in 
1932.
74
 According to Roth Davis, d’Erlanger believed Ma’luf vulnerable to extinction 
and “blamed corruptive European influences for contributing to this condition, and he 
criticized the Tunisian aristocracy in particular for inviting European music teachers to 
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their courts.”75 In retrospect, it seems quite absurd that a European immigrant to North 
Africa would criticize the locals for not preserving more of their traditional cultural 
practices. This reality is made all the more ironic for anyone familiar with the violent 
colonial history of the Maghreb as d’Erlanger was himself, French. 
On a bluff overlooking the Gulf of Tunis, d’Erlanger constructed his magnificent 
palace, Dar Ennejma Ezzhara (or, “the House of the Star of Venus”) which took over a 
decade to build.
76
 During my fieldwork, I was taken to his home by one of my 
interlocutors who remarked, “If you study Tunisian music, you must see the home of 
Baron d’Erlanger.” Upon arriving to the grounds one is struck by an awesome view 
complimented by the peaceful, faint sound of music being rehearsed in what used to be 
the home of the groundskeeper, which itself is no small dwelling. Entering the main 
house, I was immediately reminded of Beiteddine in Lebanon; the palace more closely 
reflected a turn of the 19
th
 Century Arab notable’s taste than that of a French immigrant. 
Fountains run throughout, arabesque-like woodwork decorates that which is not already 
laden with carved stucco, and the floors house stones that resemble the once-valuable 
dacite of the structures flanking the famous medieval Moez Eddin street in Cairo.  
Throughout his career in Tunisia, through writing books, promoting events, in his 
speech itself, and even in the construction of his own home, it seems that d’Erlranger 
sought to archive the ‘traditional.’ By focusing on the traditional and the promotion of it 
in order to save or redeem it, d’Erlanger both endorsed and became part of a teleological 
narrative of the modern as rupture. Archiving, such as that done by d’Erlanger, has 
historically been an integral part of colonial projects. The works and styles “saved” by 
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d’Erlanger thus became images, representations, of a world which would inevitably be 
subsumed by the force of supposedly modern, enlightened, Western culture. These same 
images (books, paintings) were often brought to the colonial capitals and placed in 
museums, whereupon onlookers could quietly whisper to each other on the primitive and 
strange nature of their vanquished foe, thus further legitimizing continued colonization.  
Even stranger than the role of archiving and redeeming of the traditional, is 
d’Erlanger’s success at constructing the traditional. The word”traditional” itself implies 
specificity and attachment:  As a category for analysis and when essentialized by an 
outsider to said tradition, “traditional” bears remarkable symmetry to the boundaries of 
tradition set forth by one who self-actualizes as traditional. What becomes part of a 
people’s traditions (and how it became so) is infinitely more complicated than is typically 
politically advantageous to point out. Consider the work of Sami Zubaida as presented by 
Ulrich Beck: 
…Sami Zubaida has shown, the ‘Indian restaurant’ is an invention of Bengalis living in 
London, as are the ‘exotic dishes’ which are now celebrated and consumed all over the 
world as ambassadors of Indian traditions. In the source of its march to globalization, the 
Indian restaurant and its characteristic menu were also ultimately exported to India, 
which stimulated Indian households to cook Indian food in accordance with the London 
inventions. Thus it came to pass that one could eat ‘Indian’ food even in India, thereby 
confirming the myth of origins.77  
 
Just as Zubaida’s Indian food was transformed into an Indian tradition, d’Erlanger’s 
grand Dar Ennejma Ezzhara has now become home of the Tunisian National Center for 
Arab and Mediterranean Music.
78
 Thus the internalized traditional re-issued by a 
European actually came to represent, host, and embody tradition.  
This blend of influences within a given tradition is of course, nothing new. 
Andalusian music, as the name would suggest was imported from Spain into the Islamic 
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Maghreb. Despite the name, however, the musician largely credited (in many sources) 
with inventing the andalusi musical style was actually a Persian
79
 ex-slave known as 
Ziryab (Blackbird) who, after arriving in Cordoba in the early ninth century, founded a 
new music school.
80
 In the long-sustained Moorish diaspora, and specifically in the 
thirteenth century, waves of immigration flooded into the Maghreb and brought with 
them this distinctive style of music.
81
 
In many of the ‘traditional’ Tunisian ceremonies, there exist any number of 
instruments that are not said to be originally of Tunisian origin, such as the gombri; a 
three stringed instrument which according to several of the musicians I spoke with, 
arrived in Tunis from West Africa over four centuries ago. The gombri is, however, used 
in many Tunisian ceremonies, especially in Sufi circles, as it is said that its sound is 
known to scare away the jinn. During a ‘traditional’ Tunisian stanbelli ceremony, one 
may likely witness participants descend into a trance which can become so intense it may 
require someone to intercede on their behalf by forcibly removing them from the 
ceremony. All of the above has evolved into a web of practices that some Tunisians 
believe, is (purely) Tunisian tradition, despite “Tunisia” as an independent nation-state 
has not yet existed for a century, and it should be mentioned, the proponents of this 
tradition are simultaneously aware of the mixed origins of their tradition’s components.  
There is no purity of tradition as far as music is concerned. The relevance of this 
point cannot be over-stated as many have asked, why during the revolution did Tunisians 
issue statements of political contestation via more contemporary [often read as: foreign] 
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forms of musician expression? It is my contention that the forms of artistic political 
contestation that are visible to the foreign observer are not only limited, but directly 
influence the forms of expression embraced by Tunisian dissidents. However, the answer 
to the above question is quite complicated as involves the role and position of different 
variations of musical tradition within Tunisian society. A detailed look at Tunisian 
society since independence therefore becomes necessary. 
 
Bourguiba, Ben Ali, and the Formation of Contemporary Tunisian Cultural Climate(s) 
In many studies of post-colonial history, academics have represented the colonial 
period as a rupture. Whether representing the multiple ruptures of invasion, occupation 
and independence, or viewing the contemporary ‘post colonial’ state as still existing in a 
position of continued (economic and political) [neo]colonization, commentators locate 
significant historical  schism(s) and rupture(s) in colonial occupation. There is indeed 
much value in this approach. However, the changes and reforms of Tunisian society in 
the period immediately following independence are much more instructive when trying to 
understand Tunisian society today and no study of this period can exclude the changes 
initiated by former president Habib Bourguiba. Bourguiba, a charismatic although 
certainly dictatorial leader, was French educated, and it seems that during his time abroad 
he internalized the leading theories of teleological development of the period
 82
. The 
particular brand of nationalism issued from Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour (“New 
Constitution”) party would cause many social changes in Tunisia towards an end that 
many today perhaps mistakenly, label as ‘secularism.’ In fact, there was certainly a tinge 
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of internalized orientalism(s) within his policies but as we shall see, ‘secularist’ is not an 
appropriate term for Bourguiba’s policies or his rhetorical basis for initiating them.  
It is true, as Clement Henry Moore has pointed out, “Bourguiba had little respect 
for the political extremists; he once said of the Pan-Arabists in Tunis and Cairo that “their 
Oriental mentality does not allow them to understand that politics is the art of attaining 
the possible.’”83 That being said, the set of policies Bourguiba put forward, and the 
decisions he made (collectively known as “Bourguibism”), displayed remarkable 
dynamism and adaptation. While Bourguiba completely rejected French influence over 
the country in a colonial setting, even to the point of being influential in stirring the 
guerrilla movement against France,
84
 after achieving independence, one might argue that 
he actually advanced several of France’s former colonial cultural initiatives. While it is 
debatable whether Bourguiba was a secularist (with all the problems inherent in that 
term), it is quite certain that he sought to impose ostensibly modern forms of state and 
social organization onto a society that,  he gave every indication he believed, still 
clumsily clung to its traditions.  
Tunisia won its independence from France on March 20, 1956, and within the 
year Bourguiba had unleashed a massive reform program on the country’s institutions.  
Both cohorts of sharia courts (Malaki and Hanafi) were “absorbed” into the state by 
August of the same year. By citing its capitulation to the former colonialists, Bourguiba 
was able to dismantle the habus system (waqf or lands that supported Islamic 
institutions).
85
 One might say that Bourguiba immediately used much of his revolutionary 
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capital in absorbing the Islamic apparati within the state. Despite the immensity of these 
initial changes, Bourguiba was only getting started. The revised Personal Status Code that 
followed only continued this trend. Kenneth Perkins, one of the leading authorities on 
contemporary Tunisian history summarizes the changes wrought by the new law: 
Women won new rights, including those of divorce and the approval of arranged 
marriages, and expanded existing entitlements in questions of child custody and 
inheritance. At the same time, the code explicitly placed obligations on women, such as 
contributing to the maintenance of the household if their means allowed. Other provisions 
outlawed polygamy, ended the male right of repudiation, and set minimum ages for 
marriages.86  
 
To Moore, this represented a “legal step which the French Protectorate for political 
reasons had never dared.”87 Therefore, many abroad were convinced that Bourguiba was 
a secularist, and indeed the jury is still out. More significant than some of the reforms 
made during his tenure, however, were his (often Islamic) arguments framing some of 
them. Moreover, it is important, as Perkins points out, to consider the increasing feminist 
demands for reform in 1955, a year before independence.
88
 Bearing this in mind, 
Bourguiba’s apparently pro-feminist reforms could be seen as a way of co-opting the 
momentum of the feminist political movement, and bringing it under the umbrella of the 
state, as was done consistently with many forces which could have potentially challenged 
the dominance of the state. The co-option of the religious apparatus, as a result, becomes 
one more instance of state monopoly.  
 After Bourguiba convinced (initially at least) many leading Tunisian sheikhs of 
his Islamic credentials,
89
 Moore explains, Bourguiba was, during the initial years, 
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referred to as mujahid al-akbar (“supreme combatant”),90 which is not bad for a man who 
once referred to the hijab (veil) as an “odious rag.”91  Perkins contends that his arguments 
could be seen as an exercise of ijtihad (an Islamic tradition commonly translated as 
“independent reasoning”).92 However, within the first year, as he was stripping their 
power in both the political and social realms, many pillars of the religious community 
began to object and oppose Bourguiba.
93
 In an interview with Asia Source, Partha 
Chatterjee stated: 
In the historical process of the emergence of the state, a great deal of mobilization had 
used religion, had depended on extremely powerful religious reform movements, of 
actually shaping what were seen to be religious beliefs and practices but also changing 
them, and reformulating them, in order to conform to what were seen to be the new 
challenges of the modern world.94  
 
This above quote seems as if Chatterjee was actually speaking about Bourguiba in 
his continued attempts to reform religious practices in order to reformulate the 
state and Tunisian society’s practices. If we accept Chaterjee’s above postulation, 
and view Bourguiba in this light, than his attempts at ijtihad and reformulation of 
religious institutions and practices may be seen as an example of a ruler 
attempting to strengthen the Tunisian government in order to, again, succeed in 
the ‘modern’ world. 
As dissent steadily began to increase, Bourguiba oversaw a continuation of 
reforms over religion, state, and society. A dual focus was placed on literacy and family 
planning, and within a few years, literacy rates were steadily increasing as birth rates 
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decreased.
95
 Despite the Malthusian convictions that framed Bourguiba’s reforms, he was 
easily able to obtain support for them from much of the Tunisian populace. Bourguiba’s 
focus on the schools is very significant for anyone attempting to understand the multi-
lingual, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural population of Tunisia today. In 1957, 96% of the 
total female population in Tunisia was illiterate.
96
 Beginning in 1958, one fifth of the 
government’s total budget was devoted to improving the educational system of the 
country.
97
 By the middle of their primary school career, students at this time could expect 
the remainder of their coursework throughout secondary school to be in French.
98
 
However, Arabic was not targeted for elimination (unlike during the colonial period) and 
continued to be the dominant colloquial language.  
Bourguiba’s prediction that French could, in the words of Perkins, “serve as a 
bridge to the rest of the world,”99 was indeed a good one. In much of the music produced 
today in Tunisia, including the music that came out during the revolution, it is quite 
common to hear the use of polyglossia and code-switching often culminating in a song 
that draws on Arabic, French, Italian, and English (among other languages). The ability 
of these works to be understood by speakers of other languages should not be 
underestimated, and of course, an artist typically desires their work to be received by the 
largest number of people possible. By incorporating different languages into their music, 
artists increase the potency of a given work, especially among the Maghrebi diaspora 
living in France.
100
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In 1960, amid increasing political unrest, Bourguiba apparently had stepped over 
the line for many Tunisians: During one of his speeches, Bourguiba articulated that 
because Tunisia was in an economic jihad against poverty within their country, fasting 
was hurting the economy and was not obligatory when undertaking such a jihad. 
Therefore, he concluded, the Muslim masses of Tunisia should not fast for Ramadan.
101
 
When Bourguiba could not obtain the support he sought from the Mufti in the form of a 
supportive fatwa, he simply relieved him of his position, thus inciting riots in 
Kairouane.
102
 For the next seventeen years, Bourguiba was to institute a number of 
reforms that would prove increasingly unpopular, such as agricultural reform and several 
measures aimed at economic liberalization, which served to motivate and empower the 
rhetoric and force of his opposition.  
Nevertheless, Bourguiba’s legacy is assured. According to UNICEF, the total 
adult literacy of females in Tunisia is 82% for the period from 2005-2009 in a population 
whose total adult literacy from 2005-2008 was 78%.
103
 Tunisian society simply cannot be 
fathomed without its remarkable levels of education relative to its neighbors, and that 
education cannot be understood without considering the state-centered educational 
reforms initiated by Bourguiba and continued by Ben Ali.  
At the very least Bourguiba was not secretive or in denial about his place within 
the Tunisian governmental body. Moore claimed in 1965 that, “when recently asked 
about Tunisia’s political system, [Bourbuiba] exclaimed, ‘The system? What system? I 
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am the system!’”104 Bourguiba, although regarded in some circles, in a favorable light 
because of the reforms he ruthlessly imposed on the Tunisian populace, was nonetheless 
considered by many to be an elitist autocrat, and by the end of his tenure as president this 
view was widely held. 
By 1986, dissidence directed against Bourguiba and his reforms was done openly 
and increasingly by those who would frame their arguments in Islamic contexts.
105
 Derek 
Hopwood argues that it was this “militant Islamic” threat which prompted Bouguiba to 
assign to his interior minister, a young Zine Abidin Ben Ali, the task of ruthlessly (or so 
Bourguiba had hoped, claims Hopwood) crushing the dissent.
106
 The Tunisian Islamic 
movement (known by its French acronym, MTI) was headed by Rachid Ghannouchi, now 
leader of the ruling Ennahdha party in post-revolution Tunisia. MTI was responsible for 
much of the dissent which became violent, detonating a series of bombs around the 
country on August 2, 1987, which killed fourteen tourists.
107
 
The role of the current Ennahdha leader in these attacks is still unclear but anyone 
who feels compelled to employ the all-neutralizing term “moderate” when referring to his 
party, should view these events as a caveat. The trial that ensued against those accused of 
the bombings resulted in a death sentence for seven men, among whom, Ghannouchi was 
not present. According to Hopwood, this event is what finally drove Bourguiba to the 
brink of insanity,
108
 and indeed the loss of his mental facilities is often present in popular 
narratives of Bourguiba’s later years. However, recent historiographies are tending to 
glorify Bourguiba, and paint the narrative of his cognitive decline as simply an excuse for 
                                                 
104 Moore, Clement Henry, Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One Party Rule, pp. 41 
105 Hopwood, Derek, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Macmillon Press, (London, UK: 1992), pp. 101. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid, pp. 102 
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Ben Ali to take power. Indeed, many of the Tunisians are now nostalgic about the 
reforms initiated by Bourguiba; I even heard some Tunisians refer to themselves as 
“Bourguiba’s children,” which speaks volumes about the paternalistic style of his rule, as 
well as the internalization of teleological notions of ‘progress’ within the nation-state.109  
On October 2, 1987, Bourguiba appointed Ben Ali as Prime Minister yet refused 
to approve his cabinet appointments.
110
 On the night of November 6-7, Ben Ali made his 
move: Using a cadre of military officers loyal to him, he bloodlessly took over the 
presidential palace, arrested loyalists, and had the requisite number of doctors attest on 
paper that Bourguiba was no longer competent to hold office.
111
 Bourguiba, who had 
slept through the entire coup, awoke the next morning to a radio address from Ben Ali 
attesting that he was now the constitutional leader of Tunisia.
112
  
At this point, much of Tunisia celebrated the deposition of Bourguiba, believing 
that Ben Ali was sincere in patriotism and promises. In his 1997 article in Middle East 
Report, Chistopher Alexander summed up the initial promises and the following decade 
in a way that seems beyond eerie to all who have watched the so called “Arab Spring:”  
The new president promised to establish the rule of law, to respect human rights and to 
implement the kind of democratic political reforms that Habib Bourguiba had steadfastly 
refused. Along with Algeria, Jordan and Yemen, Tunisia rode the leading edge of what 
many hoped would be a wave of democratic transitions in the region. Ten years later, it 
would be difficult to find another country that has moved so far in the opposite 
direction.113 
                                                 
109 Interestingly, in February of 2011, immediately following Ben Ali’s deposition, one of the songs most 
flooding the radio airwaves in Tunisia was from a French group known as Sexion d’Assault entitled, 
“Désolé,” and a dominant theme of the song is feeling neglected by society and family, in addition to the 
hard life for an immigrant in Paris. While one must be careful not to over-read such a fact, it should not be 
brushed aside considering the past half-century of markedly paternalistic and ostensibly forced ‘secularist’ 
rule in Tunisia and the many parallels one could draw within the song to Tunisian life formulated by the 
policies of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. See: Sexion d’Assaut, “Désolé,” L'École des points vitaux, 2010. 
110 Ibid, pp. 103 
111 Ibid, pp. 104 
112 Ibid, pp. 104-105 
113 Alexander, Christopher, “Authoritarianism and Civil Society in Tunisia: Back From the Democratic 
Brink,” Middle East Report, 205, Vol. 27, Winter 1997,  Acessed February 25, 2012: 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer205  
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However, contrary to Bourguiba’s fears,114 Ben Ali continued to carry the feminist torch 
in Tunisia and did not repeal Bourguiba’s gender policies. He also did not attempt to 
appease Islamists in his policies, apart from releasing many political prisoners and 
allowing Islamists a small degree of freedom to conduct activities in public space. In fact, 
by allowing the Islamists to operate in the public eye, Ben Ali also was able to more 
closely watch, and thus control, their activities.  
To portray Ben Ali as completely nefarious, however, would unfairly dismiss 
many of the institutional reforms initiated during his tenure, which continue to structure 
and inform Tunisian society to present day. In fact, among other reforms, Ben Ali 
repealed presidency for life (resolving instead to simply rig elections continually). He 
dismantled the state security apparatus, and he also created the Rassemblement 
Constitutionel Democratique (RCD) party seperate from Bourguiba’s own Parti Socialist 
Destourien (PSD).
115
 Ben Ali’s initial reforms led many to believe (in Tunisia as well as 
abroad) that he would do away with Bourguiba’s repressive state and fulfill his 
countrymen’s hopes for a more representative government. By 1991 a law was issued 
making school attendance mandatory for all Tunisians between the ages of six to 
sixteen.
116
 Alexander claims that by refusing to legalize Ennahdha, Ben Ali showed his 
true colors for the first time.
117
 This sentiment, however, is somewhat anachronistic, 
given the situation in neighboring Algeria. Youth riots in 1988 culminated in the 1991-
2002 Civil War in which, Islamist groups were an integral component of the instability. 
No doubt, Algeria’s democratic experiment was observed by the region’s leaders with 
                                                 
114 Hopwood, Derek, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Macmillon Press, pp. 130. 
115 Alexander, Christopher, “Authoritarianism and Civil Society in Tunisia.” 
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great interest. There is no arguing against the dictatorial nature of Ben Ali’s regime, but 
given that Ennahdha and the other groups that would eventually become its constituents 
had only recently bombed numerous areas of the country, killing tourists (in a country 
where tourism constitutes a large source GDP and employment
118
), it would seem 
unlikely that even the most democratic of states would consider legitimizing such 
opposition. 
 Despite initially dismantling of the state security apparatus, installing what we 
might refer to as pseudo-due process (at least on paper), and ratifying treaties banning 
torture,
119
 the state jailed over eight thousand people between 1990 and 1992 alone.
120
 
This process of coercion and the continuation of Ben Ali’s police state steadily 
intensified until he was overthrown in 2011. A leaked diplomatic cable published on 
WikiLeaks, drafted by US diplomats during a 2009 meeting in Tunis, includes a private 
statement from the Former Canadian ambassador to Tunisia, Bruno Picard, that reveals 
how widely dismissed was Tunisia’s commitment to upholding human rights: “The 
Canadian ambassador said the GOT's [government of Tunisia's] statements that it does 
not torture are ‘bullshit.’ The Canadian ambassador said he had direct, first-hand 
evidence of torture/mistreatment of a prisoner that lasted several months.”121 The state of 
the Tunisian security apparatus and the treatment of its citizens was therefore well 
known.  
                                                 
118 Tourism accounted for a sizable source of revenue in 2010; roughly 7% of Tunisia’s GDP and 12% of 
its total employment. See: Eymen Gamha, “Why is Tunisian Tourism in Crisis?” Tunisia-Live, November 
11, 2011, accessed Febrary 25, 2012: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/11/hows-out-to-ruin-tunisian-
tourism/ 
119 Alexander, Christopher, “Authoritarianism and Civil Society in Tunisia.” 
120 Susan E. Waltz, Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics, University of 
California Press, (Berkeley, CA: 1995), pp. 72. Cited in: Ibid. 
121 Picard, Bruno, as cited in: CBC News, “Tunisia’s no-torture claim ‘crap’ – Canadian Envoy,” CBC 
News, December 2, 2010, accessed: Febrary 25, 2010, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/12/02/wikileaks-tunisia002.html 
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Despite his initial reforms, Ben Ali turned out much like his predecessor; a 
dictatorial, paternalistic (despite the trumpeting of women’s rights issues), Western-
friendly leader who continued to cling to power as he advanced in age. The elitism 
inherent in the discourse and policies of both Ben Ali and Bourguiba was obvious and 
palpable. By embracing widely accepted notions of teleological development and 
progress, these leaders advanced a body of politics openly hostile to the country’s 
‘traditions.’ 
There could be no room in the state for supposedly ‘backward’ traditions such as 
polygamy, and state institutions were to lead the charge to eradicate these cultural 
practices. Modernity was to become Tunisia’s new cultural tradition. Strangely however, 
just as Baron d’Erlanger impregnated and imbued tradition with his own (non-
‘traditional’ or foreign) interpretation, and while the former leaders’ attempts to eradicate 
traditions they thought hostile to a sense of progress heavily informed by western 
theories, the population now seeks to recover some of those same ‘traditional’ practices 
pursuant to new-found freedoms of expression and liberty.
122
 The irony in the liberty to 
pursue recovery of ‘tradition,’  is that these liberties often draw heavily on the discourses 
of democratization which betray internalized theories of teleological progression most 
often issued from (mostly western) human rights groups and NGOs: “Is [country X] 
ready for democracy?” This discourse and sentiment implies that democracy is a 
necessary endpoint upon a historically linear trajectory reachable through growth and 
maturity. Since Tunisia has proven to most of the world its ‘readiness’ to exist as an adult 
(if we accept the parent-infant motif ubiquitous in colonial discourse), we are to believe it 
                                                 
122 The reemergence of the hijab, niqab as well as other ‘traditional’ styles of dress, on Tunisian streets 
following the revolution of 2011 evince this trend. 
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has moved one step closer to western political normalities and has therefore ‘advanced.’ 
At this latest ‘stage’ in Tunisian history, the lines between traditional and modern, 
religious and secular, will continue to be redrawn, redefined, and renegotiated. Yet the 
supposedly binary division between that which is traditional and inherently hinders 
development, and that which is modern and supposedly erodes tradition, shows no signs 
of abating. This process is in itself telling, and the words of Stefania Pandolfo in her 
ethnography entitled, Imapasse of the Angels: scenes from a Moroccan space of memory, 
encapsulate it better than any I could muster:  
In its partial and fragmented style, then, this text aims to listen to the dissonant, often 
idiosyncratic voices, of an absolutely contemporary society, elaborating in its own ways 
the fractures, wounds, and contradictions, and a certain intolerable, of the Maghrebi 
postcolonial present.123 
 
The epistemic violence still induced by the traditional-modern dichotomy is 
indeed contemporary, and regardless of its origins (secularism, colonization, ect.), this 
bipartite classification represents a useful tool for (Tunisian) people seeking to articulate 
what belongs to the national identity and what does not. Thus, the perceived opposition 
between traditional and modern cannot be excised from cultural-productions, especially 
those which elaborate national narratives.    
                                                 
123 Pandolfo, Stefania, Impasse of Angels: scenes from a Moroccan space of memory, University of 
Chicago Press, (Chicago, IL: 1997), pp. 6  
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VI. THE CONTEMPORARY FIELDS OF TUNISIAN MUSIC 
Music takes many forms in Tunisia. In addition to the more ‘traditional’ styles 
mentioned above, in public places alone one could expect to hear reggae, folk, rock, hip-
hop, R&B, and even soul, among many other genres. Together, all of these differing 
styles of music, with their attendant linkages and competition, not only between artists 
and producers but between the fields themselves, for prominence in a particular niche of 
the market, culminate in a Tunisian musical field.  
As is mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the Tunisian musical field 
constitutes an arena of competition wherein non-material motivations and interests are 
seen to be the most legitimate. Bourdieu contends: 
As everyone knows, priceless things have their price, and the extreme difficulty of 
converting certain practices and certain objects into money is only due to the fact that this 
conversion is refused in the very intention that produces them, which is nothing other 
than the denial (Verneinung) of the economy.124 
 
While artists may appear or even claim to pursue material interests and still enjoy a 
certain level of success in the musical field, they still risk being perceived as 
heteronomous actors and thus resulting in abrasion for their perceived motivations. The 
autonomous sector of any field of cultural production however, and in this case the 
Tunisian art field,  to again borrow the words of Bourdieu, “excludes the pursuit of profit 
and does not guarantee any sort of correspondence between investments and monetary 
gains… it condemns temporal greatness… [and] the absence of any academic training or 
consecration may be considered a virtue.”125  Bourdieu further states that “[t]he literary 
and artistic world is so ordered that those who enter into it have an interest in 
                                                 
124 Bourdieu, Pierre, “The Forms of Capital,” Originally published as: “Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles 
Kapital, soziales Kapital,” Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2), ed. Reinhard Kreckel, trans. 
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125 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, pp. 39 
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disinterestedness.”126 This disinterestedness is present in many other fields and is most 
visible when the universal (the goal for the sake of the goal) is readily apparent. The 
more autonomy is cultivated among actors in a field, the more the field itself becomes 
more autonomous, thus lending advantage to those already in a position of orthodox 
autonomy. Further, the more the field “favors” these autonomous producers, “the more 
clear-cut is the division between the field of restricted production, in which the producers 
produce for other producers, and the field of large scale production [la grande 
production]… is symbolically excluded and discredited.”127  
The example presented to me by one of my interlocutors,Bendir Man (Beyrem), is 
instructive. Bendir Man is an artist who is widely known in Tunisian society for his 
acoustic political ballads that challenged the regime long before the onset of mass 
uprisings in 2011. Beyrem, who had long-struggled in an ostensibly autonomous mode of 
activist production within the field of musical contestation, is now reaping the benefits of 
his patient strategy.  Indeed, during the summer of 2011 posters for his upcoming 
concerts seemed to be posted on every street corner and plastered in every platform of the 
TGM, the train that travels north from Tunis to Sidi Bou Said.  
 Bendir Man’s autonomy is the result of his long struggle within the activist music 
field, but he does not contend that he was the only one who did so. He claimed that 
protest songs actually began, in the forms we now witness, two to three years ago. Even 
so, he stated that many people have made music “outside of the hand of government.” He 
added that there were many musicians during the 1970s and 1980s, such as Egyptian 
singer Sheikh Imam, who spoke about “the problems of our society.” While Beyrem 
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considers himself a member of this group of long-active activist musicians, and while his 
music is well-known, he contended that, “a song cannot be the anthem of a revolution.” 
When asked about the role of El Général’s music, Beyrem was quick to point out that he 
does not say “[Ben Ali should] leave the country… [rather] he says these are our 
problems.” This is indeed a valid point, as nowhere in his popular songs before the mass 
uprising did El Général advocate that the Tunisian populace take to the streets in protest. 
Somewhat contradictorily, Beyrem also pointed out that while he considers himself a 
protestor by making music, “music is music, [and] music of the revolution doesn’t exist.” 
While Bendir Man may seem to be policing the bounds of the activist-music field with 
some of the above points, he has most certainly (and in the eyes of many Tunisians I 
spoke with) earned his orthodox position. His works before the revolution such as “99%,” 
which references the margin of victory Ben Ali claimed in the 1999 elections, brought the 
government’s attention upon him long before he enjoyed the mass praise of a liberated 
Tunisia.
128
 I asked him what measures the government took to silence him and 
unsurprisingly he stated that they “arrest[ed] me, beat me, stole my guitar, forbid my 
media [blog, Facebook, ect.] and any concerts.”  Beyrem’s long career in the field, and 
that treatment which he is widely recognized to have endured at the hands of the Ben Ali 
regime, culminate in his ostensible autonomy within the field.   
 Another factor in the creation of autonomy or its corresponding heterodoxy is the 
‘proximity to necessity’ of a given artist. That is, some artists are unable to labor long in 
a field of cultural production without financial compensation because of personal 
constraints. A perfect example of this ‘proximity to necessity’ is that of Ahmed Mejri. 
                                                 
128 Bendir Man, “99%,” youtube.com, posted: September 18, 2009: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5ynIXvGFnw 
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Mejri, an artist in reggae and fusion among other genres, once lived in Paris, where he 
had wanted to become a policeman to support his two children. After returning to Tunis, 
however, he continued making music. Despite hearing from many that he had made 
“protest music,” Mejri claimed that he “did not protest before [the revolution], my face is 
too well-known, there would be no way for me to eat.”129 This statement is a perfect 
example of heteronomy due to proximity to necessity. Mejri simply could not afford to 
make music that would bring little to no profit, and his family would have suffered if he 
had.  
In December of 2010 into January of 2011, Mejri began to attend protests and 
play political music publicly. As there was now an audience for it, and thus preexisting 
demand, making activist music was presumably more profitable at this time (in both the 
material and non-material senses of the word). Mejri stressed the importance of music in 
the face of repression: “[at the protests] they took my guitar… but people were 
aggressive… you can stop everything but music.” So he continued playing. When I asked 
him what he sang about during those days, he replied: “revolution everywhere, revolution 
cleanse the earth, Tunisians cleanse the earth’s pollution!” Mejri then pointed out to me 
that in the past, nearly everyone made music that was for dancing, so that they may dance 
to forget: “when you dance, you think of nothing else.” Now, claimed Mejri, the new 
musicians “talk about problems... [and] there is violence in this music.” While he is right 
to point out the epistemological violence in these new narratives, it is interesting and 
informative that his original aversion to political music was rooted in his proximity to 
                                                 
129 Mejri was not lying when he said his face is too well-known in Tunisia. During our interview at an 
outdoor café, it seemed every five minutes someone would pass and begin talking to him including three 
other musicians, a television talk show host, a music professor, and others. Custom dictated that he greet 
and give salutations to them all. Frustrated by all the distractions, in my notes for the interview I even 
scribbled, “this guy knows EVERYONE.” 
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necessity. Arguably, it was this same necessity which drove his trajectory toward making 
political music when the rewards were apparently higher. Thus, if we are to take Mejri’s 
account of events and assign to him some degree of heteronomy, then it should be noted 
that autonomy or heteronomy within the field was not (and is not) simply a function of 
choice, but is determined by many other factors and socioeconomic restraints. 
Autonomy also entails a certain level of (at least perceived) freedom; freedom 
from institutions, bureaucracies, and for my purposes as Bendir Man stated, freedom 
from the “hand of government.” Nowhere is this freedom and its importance in Tunisian 
cultural production more clear than in the case of the declining role of Bab Athaqafa after 
the revolution. Bab Athaqafa was similar to a ministry of culture, but can better be 
described as a state institution that exercised a structural control over cultural production 
within the country. This institution awarded money and lent equipment to aspiring artists 
as long as they appeared (according to my interlocutors) to have no intention of issuing a 
work of dissent, or ‘rocking the boat’ as we say in English. One of my interlocutors, 
Hichem Ben Farhat, a cinematic director, civil jurist, and film critic whose cinema club 
was harassed heavily by the former regime for some of its members’ political activities, 
was friends with the then-president of Bab Athaqafa in Ariana, Tunis. Ben Farhat told me 
that the president allowed his club to continue to meet so long as they did not ‘stir up’ 
any trouble, as his mandate was to “put the culture to sleep” or to “make it lay down” 
(tarqud athaqafa). The various fields of Tunisian cultural production were therefore 
structured to favor those artists whose works were politically neutral or focused on social 
issues that would have favored the regime’s policies. Bab Athaqafa’s role in stifling 
political dissidence is most apparent when examining cinema under Ben Ali. The 
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perceived freedom associated with autonomy mentioned above however, requires the 
artists to already possess “substantial economic and social capital” to live on while 
engaging in their disinterested pursuits,
130
 especially when they were operating outside of 
the realm condoned and promoted by Bab Athaqafa.    
 Despite Beyrem’s conviction that there could be no “anthem of the revolution,” 
music maintains a unique importance in culture. As Will Atkinson has highlighted, 
“’nothing… more clearly affirms one’s ‘class, nothing more infallibly classifies, than 
tastes in music.”131 While Bourdieu’s above postulation had to do with class distinctions, 
it might be said that music can also be an indicator of sentiments within a class or 
segment of the population and thus, reflect the tensions, contradictions, and ills of a 
society. Music therefore can be a very useful indicator, as well as a driver, of public 
opinions. 
Not everyone agrees that music is so indicative. In Warring Souls: Youth, Media, 
and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution Iran, Roxanne Varzi contends that western journalists 
and policy makers are simply so obsessed with finding the secular in Iran, they skim the 
“surface” in order in order to find it.  Examples of this focus on the “surface,” Varzi 
contends, consist of highlighting “Baseball caps, pushing back the hijab a bit further, 
listening to rap music, or painting graffiti all over Tehran.”132 Unsurprisingly, I disagree; 
these things are not all indicative of the “Western” or “secular” (whatever that word 
entails), but are in fact embodied in and saturated with deeper meanings, which Varzi 
                                                 
130 “The length of time for which a given individual can prolong his acquisition process depends on the 
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debunked, Bourdieu buttressed,” Poetics, No. 39, 2011, pp. 170 
132 Varzi, Roxanne, Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution Iran, pp. 173 
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herself documents quite effectively in this book. Rap, hip hop or any other musical form 
is not necessarily a sign to be read by a putative outside analyst, but when the musical 
form exists in a capacity surpassing simple entertainment or distraction; it automatically 
gains significance, especially if it contains themes of political contestation at a politically 
unstable time.  
When I asked Bendir Man how the widely-noticed hip hop artists may have 
influenced society, he replied that “rapper influence is a mirror.” He continued by saying 
that after the revolution there were two types of music: those works that conveyed 
“disappointment” and those that were “celebratory.” Of those who sang celebratory 
music, he claimed (with seemingly no value judgment in his tone) that “these are the 
same [type of] singers who celebrated the 7
th
 of November (the date Ben Ali took 
power).” He paused for a moment and simply stated, “it’s normal.” Based on the other 
statements Beyrem made during the interview we may safely assume that he located 
himself within the disappointed camp and believed that there was still much work to be 
done. However, despite associating those who made celebratory music with the former 
regime, the tone of his voice and his statement that “it’s normal,” lead the researcher back 
to the seemingly obvious point that music will often mirror a diverse array of popular 
sentiments.   
 
The Genre as a Field 
In addition to representing essential components in an all-dominating musical 
field, each musical genre is itself a field containing: (1.) A dominant form of capital 
(described in th introduction of this thesis) that, it should be noted, does not remain static. 
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(2.) Competition among actors involved and more particularly, an orthodoxy being 
persistently contested by heterodoxy within the field.  (3.) Established and recognized 
means of consecration within or excommunication from the field. (4.) Rules that loosely 
structure the actions of those within the field; and that depending on how they are 
followed and/or broken, these rules can determine the consecration or excommunication 
of any agent within the genre.   
Genres and categories of music, while sometimes arbitrary, often distort and alter 
the struggles with the asserted category. Atkinson shows that:  
categories of music… [only] obscure the patent hierarchies of legitimacy within such 
categories (e.g., ‘difficult’ versus ‘light’ classical, ‘underground’ versus ‘pop’ rap music), 
the different meanings that may be attributed to classifications (e.g., what counts as 
‘classical’ for one person might not for another), the various ways of consuming the same 
products (e.g., with irony, aestheticisation, passivity) and the impact of struggles and 
evolutions in the fields of production.133 
 
This is indeed true although I would add that the same obscuring role of Atkinson’s 
categories is present in most fields, in that recognition of the field alone distorts and 
disguises the differences, rules, and competition within it. 
Despite a formidable structure of rules for competition, cultural pressures 
habituating participants to aspire to certain forms of capital, and an apparatus to reward 
cooperation as well as discourage deviation within the system, there can be no 
encapsulating of a genre into a label without committing the sin of generalization. In his 
book entitled, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics, 
Charles Hirshkind begins by (among other arguments) chastising those who label cassette 
sermons as Bin Laden’s “low-tech weapon” and claim that these sermons are responsible 
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for radicalizing many in the MENA region.
134
 Hirshkind argues against this trend by 
stating:  
To read the cassette sermon primarily as a technology of fundamentalism and militancy 
reduces the enormous complexity of the lifeworld enabled by this medium, forcing it to 
fit into the narrow confines of a language of threat, rejection and irrationality.135 
 
Examples of analysts and governments perceiving music as a “weapon” similar to these 
cassette sermons are numerous. Varzi illustrates how Sufism has become so “cool” in 
Northern Iran that the government’s “response has been to produce its own brand of 
popular mystical music (a recording of Rumi being the first) in order to appropriate or 
compete with the Islamic influences that are outside the state’s influence.”136 Tunisian 
hip-hop is afflicted by similar analyses. All too often, people around the world slap the 
reductionist moniker of “resistance” on hip-hop and similarly pack the entire genre into a 
category (with no regard even for national specificities) with the connotations of 
dissidence, alternative moralities, and sometimes even violence.  
While they may (or may not) contain argumentative political discourse, hip-hop 
works are not necessarily vehicles of dissent, violence or alternative moral goods. Quite 
the contrary; the lyrics sung by hip-hop artists are often more informative of the power 
structures that the artists not only exist in, but adopt and support. For instance, an artist 
may not openly state their love of capitalism, but one may easily detect admiration for its 
commonly-supposed tenets (however erroneous the association may be) such as social 
mobility. Simultaneously, if the artist presents a ‘rags to riches’ narrative, the same 
hypothetical artist may also give his/her estimation of the forces that produced their 
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impoverished origins to begin with, such as labor exploitation or poor education. A hip-
hop artist most certainly would not state that they came from wealth and lost it all; for 
these heteronomous artists, status can often be measured by accrual of wealth. Therefore 
there exist many artists worldwide who in ways support the governing power dynamics 
while simultaneously denouncing other facets of them.  
Complicit in the distortion of our perception are the mechanisms by which we 
come to learn of works, genres and categories. Atkinson shows how “compilation CDs” 
of classical music highlight “the gap between knowledge and recognition.” Someone may 
get “snippets of well known pieces” but not in-depth knowledge of classical music in 
general.
137
 Mix CDs of ‘revolutionary’ music, such as ones I encountered during research 
for this thesis, are therefore a distillation, yet another image, and provide only a small 
window into consecrated yet (and again to use the words of Atkinson), “popularized 
forms of legitimate culture.”138 We as foreign researchers of ‘revolutionary’ music are 
thus mostly doomed only to “recognize,” as “knowing” lies beyond that which has been 
presented to us, on the internet, television, and even in person.  
The foreign status of many observers is not the only barrier encountered when 
attempting to analyze such expansive worlds of cultural production. Indeed, the barriers 
erected to maintain definite boundaries of a specific form of cultural production and its 
products can be equally stifling to those who share national, cultural, ethnic and other 
identities with the producers of the works they hope to understand. In Birth of the Clinic: 
An Archaeology of Medical Perception, Michel Foucault speaks of the use of language 
and linguistic devices in the esotericization of the medical discipline:  
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This new esotericism is different in structure, meaning, and use from that which made 
Molière’s doctors speak in Latin: then it was simply a matter of being understood and of 
preserving at the level of linguistic formulation the corporate privileges of a profession; 
now operational mastery over things is sought by accurate syntactic usage and a difficult 
semantic familiarity with language. Description, in clinical medicine, does not mean 
placing the hidden or invisible within reach of those who have no direct access to them; 
what it means is to give speech to that which everyone sees without seeing- a speech that 
can be understood only by those initiated to true speech.139  
 
For Tunisian music of political contestation, speech acts too may be issued to target the 
largest possible audience or (and sometimes simultaneously) issued to construct a further 
barrier to those attempting enter into the discipline. 
Language, and for that matter the metrics of communication (accent, target 
demographic, etc.), become important criteria for an applicant of many different fields; 
hip hop and Tunisian urban music(s) are no exception. The overwhelming use of Derja 
Tunsiyya (Tunisian dialect), despite interspersing of polyglossia and code switching, by 
Tunisian vocalists is instructive. In the documentary film about him, Pierre Bourdieu 
stresses that if it were not for the lesser, more stigmatized forms of French being spoken, 
then the prestigious dialect of the dominant classes would not have the worth it now 
enjoys.
140
 Likewise, if it were not for the preponderance of French encountered daily in 
the coastal towns of Tunisia, in government offices and academic spaces, or the Fus’ha 
(Classical Arabic) also being spoken by government officials and within the media, than 
the use of Tunisian dialect would not have the same importance and potency it enjoys in 
these musical productions. This dynamic was not lost on Ben Ali whose oft-quoted last 
speech before he left the country employed an extensive and obviously tactical use of 
Tunisian dialect in an attempt to encourage his audience to sympathize with him. Ben Ali 
even made it a point to state “I am speaking to you in the language of all Tunisians, male 
                                                 
139 Foucault, Michel, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, Trans. Smith, A.M. 
Sheridan, Vintage Books 1994, pp. 115.  
140 Bourdieu, Pierre, in: “Sociology is a Martial Art,” 
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and female” (kalimkum fi lugat kul et-tunisi wa tunisiat),141 thus affirming the 
overwhelming legitimacy of Tunisian dialect in the field of national politics at that time.  
The use of Tunisian dialect, or the use of French or any other language, does not 
always preclude the other language’s inclusion. Quite the contrary, often the use of 
several languages at the same time in a given statement or even sentence are crafted and 
can specifically apply to a certain audience, class, and level of education. This 
intersection of many languages can represent poly-linguistic exclusivity, and can itself be 
used as a bulwark against those who do not share the linguistic capabilities (and therefore 
class and education) of a statement’s issuer. Examples of this unique mixing of languages 
are abundant. In several of the songs originally sent to me from friends on a mix album of 
music from the Tunisian revolution, English, French, Spanish, Arabic, and Italian are 
mixed seamlessly. One song from the artist Nordo, contains a sample of Ben Ali’s 
opening phrase from his last speech “ay muwatinun,” to which the artist responds, “te 
vaffanculo” which means “yes citizens” (Arabic), “go fuck yourself” (Italian).142 In the 
same song the artist asks, “Weenu Ben Ali? No si después, Tahya Tunisi” (“Where is Ben 
Ali?” (Tunisian dialect) “If no then” (Spanish) “long live Tunisia” (Tunisian dialect).143In 
Niz-Art and Emino’s “Menni Lik” the artists state “attini (“give me” Tunisian dialect) my 
liberty.”144 In another profane yet humorous example, El Général says in his song “Ta7ya 
Tounes,” “Alhamdulillah (“Thank God” Fus’ha) fucking ala tool (“constantly” or “all 
the time” Tunisian dialect).”145 These are not simply examples of meaningless 
                                                 
141 For the video of Ben Ali’s last speech with English subtitles (although I added to the translation) , see: 
Muirr025, “Tunisian Dictator’s Final Speech (English Translation),” Uploaded January 29, 2011: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ou6Oqnz4O4I 
142 Nordo, “Revolution,” La Révolution 2011, Rap-Tunisien.Net  
143 Nordo, “Revolution,” La Révolution 2011, Rap-Tunisien.Net  
144 Niz-art & Emino, “Menni Lik,” La Révolution 2011, Rap-Tunisien.Net 
145 El Général, “Tahya Tounes.”  
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polyglossia, they both target and appeal to certain sections of the Tunisian population 
while eluding others. The polyglot exclusivity above may also be seen as an 
esotericization of the legitimate language of Tunisian hip hop and thus a barrier to entry 
for aspiring artists as well as a ‘carving out’ of the target audience.    
   
Differences, Legitimacy, & Evolution  
Hip hop, and for that matter all urban music, showcases a plethora of discourses. 
A hip hop artist’s discourse is not necessarily political, and even when it is, it doesn’t 
necessarily have to be against the state or governing power structure. Hip hop can be used 
for any number of purposes. Hip hop (and perhaps music in general), while perhaps a 
useful tool to deliver a political message in a potent distillation, is now being used by 
new groups in new ways. Islamist groups such as Ennahdha (in Tunisia) and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt have recently enlisted hip hop artists who continually voice their 
support for the Islamic movements. Nouri Gana expands on what he called Tunisian 
rapper Psycho M’s “fifteen minute [long]… attack on Arab nationalists and secularists 
alike and [he] accused them of involvement in a Euro-Zionist plot against Islam.”146 The 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt caught on a little bit later and posted their “first rap” video 
on Youtube on December 2, 2011.
147
 This particular video is quite interesting as forty 
five seconds into the song an Eminem album cover is then featured as the graphic for a 
full twenty seconds with an overlaid, long apology about how the graphic was included 
                                                 
146 Gana, Nouri, “Rap, Rage, Revolt,” Jadaliyya, August 5, 2011, Accessed: October 11, 2011, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2320/rap-rage-revolt 
147 Author unknown, “ةلادعلاو ةيرحلا بزح بار ةينغا لوا” posted: December 2, 2011, Accessed December 3, 
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by mistake.
148
 Also, the only caption to the video reads, “first rap of the [Muslim] 
Brothers. Picture of Eminem entered by mistake.”149 For anyone familiar with Eminem’s 
sometimes violent and obnoxious lyrics, this mistake is beyond surreal; and hilarious 
because it could have been easily fixed with a few minutes of editing. The choice not to 
edit the video along with this “first rap” is a good example of how these categories can be 
further obscured, and how a genre, even Islamic hip hop incorporates much of that which 
came before it, in different fields, regardless of an original work’s apparent logical 
opposition to the new work.   
Bourdieu wrote that the, “artistic field is a field of forces, but it is also a field of 
struggles tending to transform or conserve this field of forces.”150 Therefore the 
contemporary Tunisian soundscape of political contestation cannot be separated from its 
past forms, which it seeks to either modify or continue. Given that hip hop seemed to 
become the preferred (or most internationally consecrated) vector of political contestation 
during and following the revolution, this musical tradition both builds and expands upon 
a longer history of folk, reggae, and acoustic music that ostensibly challenged the regime 
in years past. More importantly, Bourdieu contends that the “effect” of a given work even 
“transforms” the conditions of its reception.151 The work of Bendir Man (and others 
before him) therefore helped to transform not only how his work was received, but the 
field(s) of  both the production and consumption of political contestation, wherein other 
artists would arise and use new strategies to the same end in a field (and pursuant to 
capital) that most certainly was viewed as legitimate. In other words, the game and the 
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149“أطخلا قيرط نع تلخد منيميا ةروص ...اوخا بار لوا” Translation by the author, See: Ibid. 
150 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, Polity Press, 
(Cambridge, UK: 1993), pp. 30. 
151 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, pp. 31 
 71 
stakes may have remained somewhat the same, although the methods of playing were 
constantly evolving.  
 This evolution and adaptation of political contestation first from acoustic musical 
forms, and later to hip hop is explainable by the catalyst provided by external events, ie 
the revolution. Indeed, Bourdieu speaks to this by stating that the “position takings which 
clash with the prevailing norms of production and expectations of the field, they cannot 
succeed without external changes. These may be political breaks, such as revolutionary 
crises, which change the power relations within the field… or deep-seated changes in the 
audience of consumers who, because of their affinity with the new producers, ensure the 
success of their products.”152 It is this change and this heterodoxy which challenge 
existing norms within the field by introducing new “doxa” and new methods.153 In the 
case of Tunisian music of political contestation, this translated into new political 
messages issued through a different vector; hip hop. Thus, the supposed genesis of 
musical contestation in Tunisia may be partly explained by the vastly increased use of hip 
hop and other urban music, during the revolution, in ways not particularly prevalent 
before the change that the uprising constituted in the political landscape. Yet Bourdieu 
stresses, that “as a producer but also as a consumer, one has to possess the whole history 
of a field.”154 It therefore seems quite obvious that Tunisian hip hop artists who began 
their messages of contestation must have encompassed and built up the work of those 
such as Bendir Man, not only departing from the norms such work created.  
An interesting example of the ways in which a field must embody histories can be 
found in the short Tunisian film “Cuirasse Abdelkarim,” a play on words mimicking the 
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French title of the Soviet film “Battleship Potemkin”: “Le Cuirassé Potemkine.”155 This 
silent film published roughly seven years before the 14 January Revolution, depicts a 
number of Tunisian youth attempting to get visas at a government office and once 
rejected, they rebel with the caption reading “Mais non, la seule solution c’est de se 
révolter!” After their initial act of rebellion, and just as in the Soviet film, the police crack 
down harshly and the protestors flee down an iconic staircase. One protestor pushing a 
stroller is shot and the carriage begins to roll down the stairs as the people flee to the 
water signaling a boat.
156
 This film not only modeled itself on the Soviet revolutionary 
film and borrowed even its sound score, but seemed to postulate that something similar 
would happen in Tunisia soon thereafter. The last caption is eerily prophetic of governing 
narratives of the uprising’s causality: “Et de cette façon a été [sic] la révolution[,] une 
révolution déclenchée par un homme deviendra le seul moyen[,] pour la réalisation des 
rêves d’un peuple entier.” (“And in this way the revolution, a revolution brought by one 
man, becomes the only way for the realization of the dreams of an entire people”).157 It is 
also interesting that the last bit of the movie contains an audio dialogue of a man 
attempting to escape to the island of Lampedusa (presumably aboard the boat the people 
were signaling) and being refused because he has no seat.
158
 This is interesting as many 
Tunisians did indeed flee to Lampedusa during the revolution and after, but also because 
the man in the film like many of those seeking refuge, was refused.
159
 The incredibly 
interesting facets of this short film cannot be overlooked, and its message is surely one of 
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political contestation, but it is most telling that this movie embraced and utilized the 
model set forward by a Soviet production. This is but one example of how those within a 
field must indeed encompass the entire history of the field and how that field (such as that 
of revolutionary activity) embodies and borrows from the histories of other nation-states. 
 In addition to encompassing broad histories within a field, as methods and 
delivery of cultural products evolve so too does the status of their producers whether they 
are willing or not. After interviewing Mejri, I spoke with him on the telephone and he 
jokingly insinuated that it was because of the revolution that anyone cares about Tunisian 
musicians and their struggles against the repressive state. I of course, vehemently 
disagreed. The way in which others spoke of Mejri (‘he has been making protest music 
for a long time’), despite Mejri’s  claim that no one really made protest music before the 
revolution and “it was all ‘habibi I love you’” adequately conveyed to the researcher that 
he is perceived as somewhat of a ‘classic’ of the contestation realm. 160  Mejri’s above 
statement therefore may be better interpreted as evidence of his awareness that 
(seemingly) external events pushed his work and himself into the realm of a “classic.” 
The length of the production cycle of a given producer is also important;
161
 some 
may figure artists such as Bendir Man to be more autonomous and dominant within the 
field of musical contestation simply because he has been striving in his labors for several 
years preceding the revolution. Still some others may come to regard El Général as more 
heteronomous simply by virtue of his quick success, creating a product for which a 
demand already existed, and seemingly cashing in. This is however not the argument of 
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this thesis, as it is quite obvious that El Général’s works helped to form the field and 
therefore produce the demand for his music and his message. Yet his quick success most 
assuredly registers as a threat to the orthodoxy of the field. When speaking about the 
newly arrived and quickly consecrated (within the international news media) artists, 
Bendir Man was quick to point out as was stated earlier, that he was happy not to be on a 
“list of people like Lady Gaga.”  
 The converses of these hyper-visible artists are those that neither the journalist nor 
the academic can see. Popular artists before the revolution included artists such as Saber, 
Balti, as well as others, and yet their music was never overwhelmingly political or 
dissident. In addition to El Général, Emino, Klay BBJ and many others were visibly 
making politically charged hip hop after the revolution. One may speculate that these 
artists are simply now able to do what they could not before, without legal penalty. 
However, the negative effects of the state repressive apparati are but one dimension of 
this dynamic. Another facet to consider is the effect of the rewards that were available to 
those who complied via government institutions such as Bab Athaqafa. Again though, the 
artists that are visible to the observer do not constitute the entire body of Tunisian 
musicians and the mechanisms that made those apolitical artists visible before the 
revolution, are the same mechanisms whose absence contributed to the state of the field 
now.  
Conclusion 
 The Tunisian musical field contains many works and artists of every stripe. The 
many tacit rules and implied norms that these works and artists adhere to or reject are 
quite visible if one applies Bourdieu’s theory on the field of artistic production. The same 
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structures appear when looking at a genre such as activist music as well and although 
many analysts trumpet the music as a weapon motif, labeling an entire genre or category 
of music as a weapon collapses the many political realities and power struggles within the 
object of analysis, thus committing the same mistake as those who label Raï or hip hop as 
“music of resistance.” One may issue such a label but to do so ignores the competition 
(among producers) and “resistance” (to the rules of the field) within the genre itself. 
 The mechanisms of consecration both utilized and imposed on those within the 
Tunisian music field distort as well as alter the realities and social structures within the 
field. These mechanisms of consecration, although some seem ostensibly despised by 
certain actors, have become an integral part (and tool) of the competition(s) within the 
field. Yet, many barriers exist which limit the availability or penetration of the 
mechanisms. Language is perhaps the largest barrier to an outside researcher despite its 
role in defining the audience of a particular product, and polyglot as well as poly-
linguistic exclusivity, both make a given message (often simultaneously) more accessible 
to some, and more esoteric to others.  
 Differing political and apolitical discourses also blur objectification of a genre as 
large as hip hop. The advent of Islamic hip hop artists, state co-opted Raï music, and 
Iranian government-issued Sufi music show how a genre can be adapted to any purpose. 
These adaptations and the apparent evolution of a genre that follows are therefore natural 
and help in creating the vibrant world within a field that we may observe at any point in 
time. When examining Tunisian music (cinema, and other cultural productions) of 
political dissidence and contestation, nothing so altered the field as did the revolution and 
the resultant declining influence of Bab Athaqafa. Thus the reality of the musical and 
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political realm is laid bare; Bab Athaqafa most assuredly held structural controls over 
cultural productions, while in the end, these same cultural productions (whether inside the 
bounds of Bab Athaqafa’s mandate or not) helped in not only mirroring public sentiment 
but as was discussed, influencing a populace which brought about the changes that 
effectively neutralized Bab Athaqafa. The nature of these ‘structuring structures’ was 
cyclical indeed. 
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VII. JOURNALISTIC CONSECRATION: Mutual exploitation? 
 
 Journalism is an interesting field in any country as it maintains an unparalleled 
ability to convey news and ideas across vast distances with ever-increasing speed. Before 
14 January 2011, much of the international news media was not yet fixated on a 
revolutionary Middle East as Tunisia has a small population relative to other countries in 
the MENA region and was also not seen as having the strategic importance of a country 
such as Egypt. With the outbreak of mass protests, followed by the flight of Ben Ali and 
his wife, the country gained added significance in the media’s eyes as the former 
president’s overthrow justified and legitmized the efforts of the protestors. The few 
journalists reporting on events in Tunisia became many as the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ 
became a news headline and the slow flourishing of human interest stories had begun. 
Like the artists mentioned in previous chapters who made protest music only after Ben 
Ali’s abdication, however, the international news media did not simply commodify the 
event to sell their product. The international news media was an important part of not 
only the revolution itself and the creation of its historiography, but was also a key 
component in shaping actors within the revolt and the methods they used.   
Television, according to Bourdieu, maintains a tight monopoly on the 
“instruments of diffusion” of information.162 More importantly, the journalistic field 
represents a unique mechanism of consecration which has permeated every field
163
 and 
maintains a corrupting, heteronomous impact on the autonomy of a given field. Over the 
past half-century claims Bourdieu, structures have changed to allow any actor from any 
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field to gain consecration through the journalistic world.
164
 Bourdieu states that those 
within the “journalistic field owe their importance in society to their defacto monopoly 
on large-scale informational instruments of production and diffusion of information… 
They control in effect… ones ability to be recognized as a public figure.”165   
Naturally television and journalism are well-known tools to reach a mass 
audience and are used as epistemological battlegrounds (the frontline to continue the 
metaphor) by both politicians and protestors alike. Despite the perception within the artist 
field that marketing art to a mass audience detracts from individual autonomy and is thus 
often avoided, Tunisian artists (and indeed all artists) are influenced by popular media in 
subtle yet substantial ways. Additionally, when one mixes activism with art, the ‘rules of 
the game’ change as do the capital goals. This is not to suggest that artist-activists simply 
sought consecration (or renown) but rather; the universal of activism (and the importance 
of a political message’s dissemination) overtook the ‘rules of art’ temporarily. The 
consecratory role of the news media has thus changed (and continues to alter) all the 
fields of cultural production forever. 
The journalistic consecratory apparatus is not without its price and the result of 
the competition for “the scoop” is a simplified, reductionist, and often homogenous 
presentation of events. The international news media deals with a “highly perishable 
good” which only increases “competition for the newest news (‘scoops’).”166 This 
dynamic, in tandem with the journalistic tendency to “focus on simple events, that are 
simple to cover,”167 produce an inaccurate image which distorts reality and alters it as 
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well. The journalistic field is inaccurate as it simplifies events, and modifying, as it 
highlights (and consecrates) specific figures over others, making them important and 
bestowing upon them significant symbolic capital.  This of course causes detectable 
abrasion within a more autonomous field of cultural production, such as activist-music. 
Between artists immediately recognized (and almost universally lauded) for their 
contribution to the revolutionary/activist field such as El Général, and those whose 
presence in the international news media’s narrative of events is more limited such as 
Bendir Man, there exist many differences and therefore tensions. Artists such as Bendir 
Man follow an archetype: they produce something for which no demand necessarily 
exists, but over time “create their own audience.”168 Artists such as El Général, having 
been quickly picked up by the international news media, appear more heteronomous, and 
due to resultant shorter cycle of production do not always satisfy the orthodoxy of the 
artist-activist realm. The consecratory role of the journalistic field may therefore simplify 
and collapse the cycle of production within activist-artist production, simultaneously 
elevating a producer in the eyes of the masses and staining their value in the eyes of other 
producers for not having followed the ‘rules.’  
The reader will recall how the last chapter highlighted the quote by Bendir Man 
that he was happy not to be on a “list of people like Lady Gaga,” thus evincing suspicion 
and even disdain for not only those who are quickly consecrated (and have shorter cycles 
of production), but also for the faults and distortions inherent in the journalistic 
mechanism(s). Ahmed Mejri also commented on the role of television and the media in 
altering the fields of Tunisian cultural production. He stated that “too many people watch 
television” where unauthentic musicians “make it [music] commercial.” Despite his 
                                                 
168 Bourdieu, Pierre, On Television, pp. 27-28 
 80 
proximity to necessity (“I have to eat”) dictating the extent of heteronomy of his own 
work (he was not completely free to choose), Mejri still internalized and reissued the tacit 
rules of conduct within the music field. Mejri’s ‘policing of the bounds’ of his field is 
certainly important, but it should be noted that by reinforcing the primacy of the more 
autonomous within his field, Mejri was buttressing and reproducing the orthodox-
heterodox hierarchy of the music field as well as his place within it.  
The journalistic field spent much time on hip hop artists, ignoring those who have 
been producing activist music through more acoustic productions and early twentieth 
century poets such as Abul-Qasim Al-Shabi whose works such as “To the Tyrants of the 
World,” were reportedly part of the soundscape of demonstrations not only in Tunisia, 
but in Egypt as well.
169
 Instead what one encounters is a view of cultural producers, very 
much homogenized in their assigned importance and the trumpeting of similar narratives. 
In the Tunisian case, El Général has received much more attention than Al-Shabi in the 
news media despite Al-Shabi’s more universalist discourse. Although it is difficult to 
measure the effect of any one work or artist, and despite El Général’s calls for Egypt, 
Algeria, Libya and Morocco to rise up following Tunis’ example,170 one seriously doubts 
that his mostly Tunisia-specific works were sung or chanted in another country’s protests 
as were the poems of Al-Shabi. 
Despite the specificity of his messages, journalists have lauded El Général 
unstintingly. Chistopher R. Weingarten stated in an article that El Général’s music had a 
“direct role in the Tunisian uprising and [its] potential role in the current instability in the 
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Middle East may make it one of the most influential hip-hop songs of all time.”171 In her 
article “Hip Hop and Global Unrest" Sujurtha Fernandez claims that “rap emerged as a 
soundtrack for youth rebellion… [El Général] became an icon for the movement in his 
own nation and beyond… [he and other rappers around the world] are being seen by 
many young people as emerging leaders in their nations.”172 One wonders which if any of 
the “young people” Fernandez mentions might have postulated the above, as the people I 
spoke with (including the musicians) overwhelmingly found the ubiquitous assertion that 
a small cadre of musicians led the movement (or caused it) extremely offensive and 
misguided. David Peisner asserts that “hip-hop brought down a dictator,” and in Egypt as 
well as Bahrain, protestors “adopted ‘Raïs Lebled.’”173 It is no surprise that Peisner also 
highlights the importance of social networking sites such as Facebook.
174
 Both Facebook 
and political rap reveal themselves to these journalists as not only western-friendly, but 
supposedly western in origin. By celebrating the role of rap and Facebook, these 
journalists are also celebrating themselves and their countries’ contributions that (as we 
are led to believe) made these revolutionary movements possible. In an article for NBC, 
Karl Bostic claims that El Général’s Rayes Lebled was an “anthem [that] helped to ignite 
the spark which eventually ended with thousands of people taking to the streets in 
January. Ben Ali later fled the country.”175 Bostic’s above narrative distills then-already 
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prevalent accounts, as it delivers in two sentences the most powerful and erroneous 
elements circulating in the international news media: There was a song, people listened to 
it, rebelled, and Ben Ali left town.  
The importance assigned to El  Général’s Rayes Lebled was nothing new, and it is 
a pleasantly romantic fiction to present one man whose single act of defiance ‘ignited’ the 
entire “Arab Spring.” Unfortunately, this is simply not true, and the analysts asserting this 
narrative obviously lack any in-depth understanding of a whole range of Tunisian cultural 
productions over the past few years that embodied palpable dissidence. Sami Tlili’s 2006 
short film named “Sans Plomb” is a perfect example of the limits of the journalistic gaze. 
This film begins with a teary-eyed man filling a container with petrol, taking it to the 
place of his former employment and preparing to self-immolate. The workers emerge 
from the building and plead with him not to do it. His old boss then appears and offers 
him his job back if he will just abandon his course of action. The screen then fades to 
black and reopens with a line of the workers cuing at the petrol pump, all carrying gas 
cans.
176
 The film’s name “Sans Plomb” (Unleaded) is in Arabic “Bedoun Rasas,” 
(alternative meaning: “without bullets”) which was intentionally used (according to my 
interlocutors) to imply that the Tunisian populace was being killed “without bullets.” In 
his article “Turning the Gendered Politics of the State Inside Out?” Paul Amar explains 
how self immolation turns the state’s violence against itself, and that self immolators 
“erupted onto history as explicitly non-bomber, non-terrorist reconfigurations of 
parahumanity.”177 The effect of self-immolation in neutralizing any perception of violent 
radicalism in an agent challenges the state’s portrayal of dissidents as violent killers or 
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thugs. Bearing this in mind, “Sans Plomb” can and should be viewed as a work of intense 
political dissidence which utilized an allegory in order to challenge the powerful doxa of 
the state. Tlili’s film is just one of many works in the decade leading up to the 14 January 
that has been completely glossed-over, unnoticed, or ignored by the news media when 
highlighting ‘works of resistance’ and indicates the limits of journalistic penetration into 
the various fields of cultural production. A more expansive and complicated narrative of 
the revolution as well as dissident works is unfortunately unappealing in a field that, as 
was discussed, values simple stories that are easy to report. 
Journalism, and more specifically journalists, continue to present an inaccurate 
view of events. A recent article by Asma Ghribi describes protestors in front of the 
Tunisian National Television offices, whose demands, the article suggests, are as trivial 
as they are recent in origin.
178
 During my August 3, 2011 interview with Bendir Man, he 
made it a point to state: “Now my big fight is with the Tunisian media. The boss of the 
[state] media was with Ben Ali, so now I have more problems… [The] fight for free 
expression is too long, [it is a] very long and difficult fight.” More than seven months 
later articles such as Ghribi’s are implying that these are new demands and portraying 
them as superfluous. Bendir Man concluded the above statement by saying that “freedom 
of expression is democracy,” thus illustrating his belief that if the revolutionary 
movement was to be successful, there was still much work to be done in dismantling and 
restructuring vestiges of the former regime. Further, the above statement stands as 
evidence that Bendir Man and others were reliant upon the international news media to 
                                                 
178 Ghribi, Asma, “Demonstrators Camp Out in Front of Tunisian National Television,” Tunisia-Live, 
March 12, 2012: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/12/demonstrators-camp-out-in-front-of-tunisian-
national-television/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=demonstrators-camp-out-in-front-
of-tunisian-national-television 
 84 
gain recognition as the Tunisian media under Ben Ali would not typically highlight 
dissidents and their activities. Still the news media(s) misrepresent actors, opinions, and 
circumstances not only due to their pursuit of higher ratings, but also due to personal 
opinions (and even ignorance) of reporters.   
Just as Bourdieu contended that the educational system conditioned the 
population to be able to decipher and appreciate the arts (among other things),
179
 so too 
do journalists educate the population for consumption and perceived importance of 
‘revolutionary’ productions. This dynamic is also evident in the increased embrace of hip 
hop for the purposes of political contestation as the ever-touted potency of hip hop for 
this purpose has been incorporated into the habitus of artists as well as the general public. 
This dynamic does not always work as planned and often causes visible resentment 
among cultural producers. One of my interlocutors who preferred not to be named stated 
that the trend in the media now is to focus on “women, women women” and their 
problems in the MENA region. She further stated that there is an exploitation of 
“stereotypes in order to make money” and that the current problems with the Salafis 
“wont last long… we’re not savages.” My interlocutor resented the media for not only 
exploiting stereotypes in order to make money but also furthering them. In a similar vein, 
Bendir Man stated: “My music is to the occidental people, not the media.” This statement 
is evidence of several themes. Chiefly, it is clear that Bendir Man resents the influence of 
the media on his field while at the same time he acknowledges his efforts to communicate 
with a mass audience outside of Tunisia, likely necessitating his use of many different 
forms of media to do so. This seeming paradox is but another example of how one may 
deplore one aspect of a structure, while utilizing other elements of it in order to 
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accomplish a goal. It does make sense however, as artists were unable to utilize the media 
within Tunisia due to the lack of journalistic freedoms which contributed to many artists 
configuring their careers to reach audiences outside of Tunisia. 
We may say that the global journalistic field, at least in the short term, during the 
revolution(s) and for a short period after, held an international “monopoly” on the ability 
to legitimize those revolutionary musicians it identified. This monopoly was all the easier 
to maintain as the local media did not typically cover dissident activities, leaving the 
international news media to select anyone they wanted without fear of being refuted by 
local news reports. Although the press’ original selection of musicians was trivial, the 
legitimacy bestowed upon them became important and concrete. Bourdieu once wrote: 
“One has only to think of the concours (competitive recruitment examination) which, out 
of the continuum of infinitesimal differences between performances, produces sharp, 
absolute, lasting differences…”180 Operating in a manner similar to the concours, the 
news media helped produce differences in the Tunisian musical field which became 
“lasting” and important. The influence of the international news media and its effect on 
cultural production is yet another element contributing to the angst, frustration, and 
suspicion inherent in the comments of Bendir Man and the unnamed interlocutor. Again, 
to put it simply, it was not only the news media’s tendency to misconstrue facts and 
realities, it was their ability to pervade and alter them as well that so frustrated some 
agents within the field. 
It is necessary here to outline Bourdieu’s articulation of three “competing 
principles of legitimacy.” Firstly, there is the legitimacy “granted by the set of producers 
who produce for other producers… by the autonomous self-sufficient world of ‘art for 
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art’s sake’, meaning art for artists.” Second, there is the “consecration bestowed by the 
dominant fractions of the dominant class and by private tribunals... or public, state 
guaranteed ones, such as academies, which sanction the inseparably ethical and aesthetic 
(and therefore political) taste of the dominant.” Lastly, there is the “consecration 
bestowed by the choice of ordinary consumers, the ‘mass audience.’”181 As the 
international news-media contains more than just the dominant factions of the dominant 
class, as well as serving to shape public opinion, it would seem that the journalism field 
largely employs the latter two of the above-stated principles of legitimacy. Therefore the 
international news media’s consecratory abilities are doomed to heteronomize the artists 
they highlight in the eyes of their peers, because the consecration the news media 
bestows does not originate from producers in the same field. 
In most forms of contemporary journalism, economic success yields perceived 
success in the field, and indeed as Bourdieu pointed out, “heteronomy arises from 
demand.”182 Still, despite being a predominantly heteronomous field, journalism does 
contain autonomous elements and agents who pursue cultural, social, and symbolic 
capital within the field as well as the universal of ‘journalism for journalism’s sake.’ The 
existence of awards such as the Pulitzer Prize testifies to the existence of a consecratory 
apparatus completely separate from ratings or popularity within the general public, and 
could be perceived as analogous to the “academies” mentioned above. Independent 
journalists whose ‘cycle of production’ is quite long also stand as evidence of 
autonomous elements within the journalistic field. Further and as in any field, 
professional reputation and therefore symbolic capital is important for all personalities in 
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the journalistic field. Therefore, while autonomous actors are certainly present within the 
(corporate) international news media, the journalistic field as a whole constitutes a 
largely heteronomous field. More importantly, the effect that journalistic consecration has 
in heteronomizing certain cultural producers in the eyes of their peers make its 
heteronomy two-fold: the perceived heteronomy of the news media is able to ‘rub off’ 
onto the producers it highlights. 
In a rare simplification of his arguments, Bourdieu states that “Journalists end up 
acting like the fireman who sets the fire.”183 The journalistic field not only misinterpreted 
and misconstrued the whole of Tunisian musical activist cultural production, but directly 
aided in its creation as well. While the simplifications and reductionist narratives 
abounded in their discourse, journalists performed a role of consecration for many actors 
(as well as, to be fair, bringing some international transparency and with it pressure, to 
revolutionary events). Tunisian cultural production during the 14 January revolution 
therefore cannot be divorced from the international news media which helped to create it, 
however limited or simplified their gaze may have been. 
Conclusion  
The journalistic field holds a monopoly on instruments of diffusion and with it, a 
unique ability to consecrate those in every field and Tunisian music (political or not) is 
no exception. The race for the big ‘scoops’ combines with this monopoly on consecration 
and yields a homogenization of information and opinions that distorts and alters realities 
within a field. The ability to alter dynamics within a field is often viewed with suspicion 
and the heteronomy of the corporate international news companies spills over into the 
fields it affects and in Tunisian fields of cultural production, onto the artists it 
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consecrates. The differences and competition encouraged by the international news media 
create visible secondary and tertiary differences, which ripple throughout a field before 
ossifying into a more concrete reality. The largely heteronomous principles of 
legitimation imposed on and sought by the news media are projected perhaps 
unintentionally onto the fields of cultural production. However, there are some who 
struggle in a more autonomous sector of the international news media and further 
research is necessary to determine if these more autonomous actors have the same 
heternomizing effect on their objects as do more heteronomous actors. 
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VIII. ACTIVISM AND REVOLUTION 
 Despite the distorting effect of the news media and other commentators, cultural 
production, and more simply cultural norms, played a large role in the recent uprising. 
Ahmed Mejri succinctly stated that, “there is no revolution without culture.” In the 
previous chapter, I described how a comprehensive understanding of Tunisian cultural 
production during the past decade was lacking in the international news media’s coverage 
of the uprising. There were many different forms of dissident cultural production such as 
direct challenges to the regime, allegorical stories, and the cinematic metaphors described 
in previous chapters. Likewise, the regime had many different responses for each 
individual work and artist. As one of my interlocutors pointed out, “soft” resistance was 
tolerated by the regime and often showcased in a politically charged effort to display to 
Tunisians and the world just how ‘tolerant’ the Ben Ali regime really was. 
Many of the people I interviewed highlighted how the regime tolerated opposition 
to a point. For example, Ben Farhat
184
 described the case of a man named Mohamed Abd 
Allawi. I will comprehensively convey Ben Farhat’s story, not to assert the factual nature 
of his account but rather, the overarching theme of the narrative he told. Ben Farhat had 
been somewhat of a protégé of Abd Allawi within the cinematic community. A man of 
importance within Tunisian cinema, Abd Allawi was also active in other spheres of 
Tunisian life. Ben Farhat claimed that he had been the Secretary General of the Tunisian 
Socialist party and an ardent human rights activist. Beginning in 2004, Abd Allawi’s life 
started to take a turn for the worse. Right before a (cinematic) business trip to France, 
Abd Allawi was attacked in the street and robbed of only his passport (implying the work 
of government forces attempting to keep him from leaving the country). Abd Allawi then 
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mysteriously began to have “problems at home” (understood to be trouble with his 
family) where there had never been any such trouble before. Soon there after, Abd Allawi 
was found dead and immediately ruled to be a suicide. Ben Farhat however, claimed that 
Abd Allawi had privately conveyed to him just one week prior to his death that he 
believed someone was trying to kill him, and so he wrote a letter to the local police 
station stating his concerns. After Abd Allawi’s death, Ben Farhat and friends went to the 
police to ask about the letter but were coldly told that it had never been received.   
 After Ben Farhat told me the above story, he paused and his eyes conveyed much 
of his conviction that this was what happened. The look on his face seemed to ask, ‘do 
you get it now? Do you understand what I’m telling you?’ Astounded by his honest and 
emotional account of what happened, I asked if he would prefer that when conveying this 
story I keep my source (him) anonymous. Ben Farhat then calmly but sternly leaned 
across the table and resolutely stated, “I am responsible for everything I’ve just said to 
you,” then sat back into the hard backrest of his wooden chair. In saying this, Ben Farhat 
was not attempting to alleviate my doubts; his tone, eyes and posture all suggested that 
this was what happened, and he would never be afraid to tell anyone the truth about it. A 
film critic and a jurist, Ben Farhat had read my consent form very closely before he 
signed it and had even humorously suggested some corrections for making the document 
stronger. He no doubt had read the clause on risk and how the opinions he conveyed 
during our meetings could possibly be published. For this reason, his assertion that he 
was “responsible” paired with his tone and gesticulations seemed an outright invitation to 
anyone who might want to challenge his account of what happened. 
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 Ben Farhat’s account was instructive and fell neatly within other accounts that I 
had heard. The regime had attempted to make dissident cultural production very difficult 
through artists’ reliance on Bab Athaqafa, and would also not hesitate to repress, 
intimidate, or kill anyone whose dissidence became too high profile for its liking. Some 
dissidence was tolerated and there was a threshold to what the regime would endure. 
However, it is impossible to define the comfortable space in between the two and where 
the regime drew the line. This is why highly visible and well-known dissident artists such 
as Bendir Man are so intriguing. How did they stay in this ‘sweet spot’ for so long? How 
did they negotiate activism within a violently repressive state, public personas, and 
survival? These are complicated questions that deserve more attention than I can give 
them in this thesis. Nevertheless, an understanding of the capital transformations within 
the activist field and how capital could be transported into and out of the journalistic and 
musical fields will aid in answering some of questions about how and why these artist-
activists conducted themselves.  
 Ben Farhat claimed that although the former regime was “killing talent” with Bab 
Athaqafa and subsequent economic constraints, “Tunisia was boiling with ambition.” 
Bendir Man claimed that “not just music, but the urban, underground art” was the “spirit 
of the revolution.” The term ‘underground’ in the Tunisian case was necessarily used to 
describe cultural products that were made not only outside of mainstream, heteronomous 
production (as is the connotation in much of the west) but more accurately, art that was 
made outside of the government’s control.  
 To understand just how far the government stretched into the various fields of 
cultural production, a look at the immediate pre-revolution structure of a few Tunisian 
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cinematic clubs is informative. The Tunisian Federation of Cinema Clubs (FTCC) and 
the Tunisian Federation of Amateur Cinema (FTCA) embody fields of competition unto 
themselves. Ben Farhat claimed that the resource distribution, leadership, filming and 
screening policies were all unfair. Some of the leaders in these organizations according to 
Ben Farhat have held their positions for twenty years or more which has prompted 
younger members’ attempts to dislodge them. The leaders were well-known he claimed, 
to distribute equipment and resources only two to three weeks before the big film 
festivals which would constrain what young cinematographers could produce in such a 
short time. Ben Farhat contended that this in combination with leaders privileging their 
cronies in the distribution of resources caused a noticeable degradation in Tunisian 
cinema over the years. If Ben Farhat’s contentions are accurate, they would explain why 
many within the cinematic community have attempted to change this system and even 
create their own cinematic clubs. The competitions within the cinematic communities in 
Tunisia not only shows how government-favored leaders held onto their post and stifled 
artistic production, but also how competition and contestation within the various fields of 
cultural production are subsumed or ignored by narratives of the recent uprising. While 
the political struggles within the cinema clubs alone may be seen as a sort of microcosm 
of the recent uprising, it is important to realize that the structures of the clubs were also 
made possible by the former political structure of Tunisia.  
So like the metaphor of the ‘book hider’ outlined previously in this thesis, while 
agents within the cinema club were contesting certain norms which were brought about 
due to the broader structures of power, it is impossible to discern whether members were 
contesting the Ben Ali regime by contesting leadership within the cinema clubs. Still, the 
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club members were most likely aware that the leadership of these organizations mirrored 
the power structure of the state, and that agents within the clubs were appointed by the 
state. Similar to the challengers within the cinema club structure, while discerning 
intentions among general fields of cultural production is not possible, capital and capital 
goals surface and inform the analyst of how the activist field was structured. 
I shall now turn to the structure of the activist field and its dominant form of 
capital. According to Bourdieu social capital is: 
the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition -- or in other words, to membership in a group --which provides each of 
its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a "credential" which 
entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word… The profits which accrue from 
membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible.185 
 
Social capital thus keeps groups functioning and cohesive. Bourdieu further claims that 
accrued social capital within a given actor makes them well-known, and when “their 
work of sociability… is exerted, is highly productive.”186  
 The social capital of artists and more specifically dissident artists, may be used in 
the activist field. When I asked Bendir Man if he made music during the days of mass 
uprising he replied: “[I] didn’t make songs during the revolution, I was in the street.” 
Bendir Man’s dedication to the revolution (and the revolutionary field as will be 
described below) dictated that he assert his presence and thus his activist capital within 
the movement. As we have seen, by utilizing and asserting his social capital within the 
activist field, Bendir Man aided in keeping the movement alive, cohesive, and growing. I 
also asked him the ubiquitous question of causality, and of the origin of the revolution: 
“when and where did the revolution start?” He responded wryly: “Not yet.” His 
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dedication to continued revolution and speaking out on behalf of Tunisians dominated by 
repressive systems of government and economics was therefore unfazed by the departure 
of Ben Ali. 
Bourdieu points out that the “cultural producers, who occupy the economically 
dominated and symbolically dominant position within the field of cultural production, 
tend to feel solidarity with the occupants of the economically and culturally dominated 
position within the field of class relations.”187 It is therefore no surprise that my first 
interview with Bendir Man took place inside of one of the many emerging socialist 
partys’ headquarters downtown. The implications of this location are meaningful. We 
met on Avenue Bourguiba, which is considered by many to exemplify downtown Tunis, 
and walked across the street and into an office where volunteers for this particular 
socialist party were busy preparing pamphlets in un-air conditioned rooms, strewn with 
maps of what I presumed were electoral districts. Those laboring inside of this office 
looked up taking notice of my presence, and then went back to work. The ease and 
comfort to occupy a central position (literally in the center of the offices) displayed by 
Bendir Man, and the quick acceptance of the other workers indicated an assumed 
simultaneity of struggle, or of unified purpose; whatever he was doing, those in the office 
knew he was with them. Here I do not intend to collapse the meaning of “socialist” to any 
one definition. One need only look to its differing meanings in Europe and the US in 
order to complicate the term. It should also be stated that many of the “secular” were also 
involved with the former regime, which may explain the suspicion cast upon them by 
large segments of the population. However, if they were with Beyrem, they were most 
assuredly never allied with the Ben Ali regime, and the themes throughout the interview 
                                                 
187 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, pp. 44 
 95 
often elucidated his speaking on behalf of ordinary people, further proving Bourdieu’s 
postulation above.  
 
The Revolutionary Field  
 
Beyond the long-present types of activist capital, evidence abounds on what we 
may call ‘revolutionary capital.’ The presence of this new type of capital is complimented 
by the genesis of a revolutionary field with its own inherent boundaries and rules. The 
production within this field certainly was comprised of activism, but those political acts 
that constituted this activism must have been perceivably directed within the framework 
of the ongoing revolt, or against it. Competition within the revolutionary field contributed 
and even fueled the revolutionary movement(s). Many of the artist-activist productions 
were aimed at accruing revolutionary capital, and some others, while not necessarily 
aimed at anything other than a political statement, would be assigned either a positive or 
negative amount of revolutionary capital regardless of an artist’s intent.  
The revolutionary field was not necessarily separate from the fields of journalism, 
activism, or art; indeed, in many ways it encompassed nearly all fields of cultural 
production for a certain period of time. The all-encompassing nature of the revolutionary 
field is due to the relation of external realities to the structure of fields, and the way they 
alter each other. Bourdieu stated:  
The structure of the distribution of the different types and subtypes of capital at a given 
moment in time represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e., the set of 
constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a 
durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.188 
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The structure of the social world, from the outset of the rebellion onward, caused the 
genesis of this new kind of capital and the field in which it is competed over. Further, this 
was an exponential process which pushed the revolutionary field into a more relevant and 
legitimate position while simultaneously making the capital accrued (or assigned) within 
it more powerful. To put it simply, more participation in the revolution caused increased 
(capital) benefits of participating. The more revolutionary capital was sought therefore, 
the more power accrued to all holders of revolutionary capital (especially the 
orthodoxy
189
) and the social movement. Bourdieu summarizes an analogous process: 
“Everything suggests that as the cultural capital incorporated in the means of production 
increases… so the collective strength of the holders of cultural capital would tend to 
increase.”190 However, accruing certain types of capital, even within the revolutionary 
field is not simply a matter of choice. Autonomy within the revolutionary field was 
dictated not only by capital accrual, but also, initially upon the ability to protest. In her 
article entitled, “The privilege of revolution: Gender, class, space, and affect in Egypt,” 
Jessica Winegar shows how because of certain circumstances, she was initially unable to 
participate in the Egyptian revolution as she was stuck at home caring for her child.
191
 
This constitutes another example of Bourdieusian ‘proximity to necessity’ that by its 
nature inhibits autonomy within a field.    
The ways by which certain actors achieved a position of orthodoxy within such a 
newly created field was determined by a number of factors including: ability to mobilize, 
perceived self sacrifice (including martyrdom), speech acts, and pre-established levels of 
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other forms of relevant capital such as activist capital. There were of course, many other 
ways to gain revolutionary capital and as we have seen, the mechanisms of consecration 
and legitimization for a mass audience, while producing a air of heterodoxy about the 
agent within certain fields (such as art), occupied a central role in determining levels of 
perceived importance during the revolution and thus, revolutionary capital. 
Of the ways to achieve and obtain revolutionary capital, this thesis is primarily 
concerned with speech acts. Dissident musical poetics before and during the most intense 
periods of mass protest often earned the responsible actor revolutionary capital which in 
turn yielded a cohesive social movement. As Elliot Colla stated, “This poetry is not an 
ornament to the uprising-it is a soundtrack and also composes a significant part of the 
action itself.”192 Colla goes on to highlight the importance of the poetic chants during 
these protests, and the one in particular which was heard in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 
other places: 
Consider the most prominent slogan being chanted today by thousands of people in 
Tahrir Square: “Ish-sha‘b/yu-rîd/is-qât/in-ni-zâm.” Rendered into English, it might read, 
“The People want the regime to fall”—but that would not begin to translate the power 
this simple and complex couplet-slogan has in its context.193  
 
Unlike the ubiquitous narratives asserting that hip hop rallied the protestors and 
became their “soundtrack,” this chant (ashab/ yurid/ isqat/ al-niẓam) was actually present 
in many of uprisings across the MENA region in 2011. Ahemd Mejri claimed that this 
chant was Tunisian in origin and that the rhythm and meter appeared in many other 
political chants since the era of Bourguiba: “biruh/ bidam/ nafidik/ ya Bourguiba” (“With 
our blood and souls we sacrifice for you Bourguiba”), and “biruh/ bidam/ nafidik/ ya 
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waton” (“With our blood and souls we sacrifice ourselves for the nation”).194 If one were 
looking to find linkages between the recent uprisings in the MENA region, perhaps one 
need only look to the “ashab yurid” chant. More importantly, as Colla pointed out, this 
chant represented a political act. As it was such an act, those who spoke it earned an 
amount of social capital. They stood in the protest, participated in an act of defiance, and 
did so in full view of their friends and fellow citizens. While the capital assigned to such  
a seemingly subsidiary role is not equal to that of a high profile dissident artist, chanting 
and simply being in close proximity to the physical ‘heart’ of the protest, does allow an 
individual a small amount of positive revolutionary capital.  
 The social and symbolic capital accumulations resulting from participation in 
revolutionary movements help to reproduce the hierarchical structure of revolutionary 
activists (or simply ‘revolutionaries’). Those in the upper echelon orthodoxy have a 
unique ability to consecrate or excommunicate individuals in the revolutionary field. 
Bourdieu tells us:  
If the internal competition for the monopoly of legitimate representation of the group is 
not to threaten the conservation and accumulation of the capital which is the basis of the 
group, the members of the group must regulate the conditions of access to the right to 
declare oneself a member of the group and, above all, to set oneself up as a representative 
(delegate, plenipotentiary, spokesman, etc.) of the whole group, thereby committing the 
social capital of the whole group.195  
 
As I have attempted to show, it was not only those in a position of orthodoxy 
within the revolutionary field who had the power to consecrate or excommunicate. That 
power also belonged to the news media as well as other participants within the field. The 
power to excommunicate someone within the revolutionary field is as diffuse as those 
who comprise the movement. Evidence of excommunication from the revolutionary field 
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abounds: In Egypt, there is a website showcasing a blacklist (or “lists of shame”) of 
actors, artists, and personalities who are categorized as anti-revolution.
196
 Also in Egypt, 
the “fallul” (“remnant”) graffiti movement demonstrated that anyone with a can of spray 
paint may use public space to denounce the negative revolutionary capital of a given 
figure, and thus symbolically excommunicate them (although perhaps not as strongly as 
someone in a position of orthodoxy is able to do). This previously rare word, which has 
hardly been used except in strictly military contexts before 2011, has become in itself, a 
marker for drawing boundaries between revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries in Egypt. 
In Tunisia many of the excommunicative acts also pertain to products that come 
from companies that are (or were) owned by persons with negative revolutionary capital. 
During the summer of 2011, I asked for a particular item in the grocery store that I could 
no longer find. One of the workers responded that it was “Trabelsi” (the company was 
owned by the former first lady’s family) and thus was no longer stocked. By refusing to 
stock this “Trabelsi” item, this grocery store was helping to excommunicate the Trabelsi 
family from, and simultaneously asserting their positive capital within, the revolutionary 
field. Despite the aforementioned “denial of the economy” that occurs in many fields, the 
financial benefits and detriments to those who respectively possess positive or negative 
revolutionary capital was thus laid bare. Bourdieu states that economic capital, despite 
the “denial of the economy” in many fields, “is at the root of all the other types of capital 
and that these transformed, disguised forms of economic capital, never entirely reducible 
to that definition, produce their most specific effects only to the extent that they conceal... 
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the fact that economic capital is at their root…”197 With this in mind, there is little 
difference between those artist-activists who made political music before, during, or after 
the initial uprising. My original belief that there existed “commodifications” (in the 
Marxist sense) of nationalism or the revolution after the departure of Ben Ali was 
upended by Bourdieusian theory: There were no cultural productions that were non-
commodified, only those which better disguised their economic capital goals and those 
which failed to convincingly do so, yielding the dichotomy between the autonomous and 
heteronomous respectively. 
In this chapter we have seen that activist capital is largely comprised by social 
capital and can be consecrated and made into symbolic capital by those within the field 
and those outside of it. The capital gained by a dissident artist could often be used in 
activism alone although the position of a given artist may vary in each individual field. 
For example: an autonomous artist in pursuit of political activism may use all tools 
available in order to target the largest possible audience. The artist’s short cycle of 
production and attempts to use tools such as the news media (recognized as 
heteronomizing) to disseminate a political message may induce other artists to perceive 
them as more heteronomous than previously. The tacit ‘rules’ within the activist field 
allow for dissidents to use all media available to them, whereas those within the art field 
do not allow for full use of all media and harm the image of any agent utilizing certain 
“instruments of diffusion.” In this way, a given actor could be perceived as autonomous 
and orthodox within the activist field, and simultaneously heterodox within the field of 
art. With these social structures to negotiate, it is no wonder that symbolically dominant 
cultural producers often identify with those dominated in many other fields. 
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The genesis of the Tunisian revolutionary field (and perhaps an international one 
as well) helped to further orient these producers as well as the movement that they had 
become a part of. The more cultural producers participated in the revolutionary field, the 
more the movement grew and the more power was wielded by the more highly-visible 
artists within the movement. This power which was brought about through the holding of 
revolutionary capital, like all forms of power, does carry financial incentives to 
participation and orthodoxy as well as disadvantages for those who resist the field and 
work against it. The revolutionary field is not alone in this regard and, despite the 
widespread “denial of the economy,” material capital is a determinant in all the fields 
explored within this thesis.  
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CONCLUSION 
 In this thesis I began by deconstructing the ideas of resistance and tradition in 
order to challenge governing narratives on the role of music in civil unrest and have also 
tried to illustrate the problems involved with stuffing an entire genre of music into any 
label. Although the ‘music as a weapon’ motif has continually surfaced in Iran, southwest 
Asia under the Soviets, Algeria during and after colonization, and now in Tunisia, we 
should be careful when interpreting works in this way as we have an effect on not only 
which works are consecrated and noticed, but also on the political realm from which 
these works have come. Further, while a potent distillation of political sentiments and 
easily accessible to foreign analysts, music was not the only body of cultural productions 
to challenge the Tunisian government. The connection between cinema, music and other 
productions clearly merits further research. 
 Journalism as we have seen, quite clearly elevated and consecrated certain artists 
as well as cultural producers and many artist-activists positively used this to their 
advantage. The overlapping nature of the different fields of production in combination 
with the differing capital goals within them, affect perceptions of artists, activists, and 
journalists alike, at home and abroad. Perhaps most importantly, the declining role of Bab 
Athaqafa, and the vectors of governmentality that came with it,
198
 in the structures 
governing fields of cultural production caused profound changes, and was influenced by 
equally profound changes, within the fields, capital goals, and the artists themselves. The 
realms of Tunisian cultural production have thus been in a state of flux during and since 
the revolution, which may have yielded the narratives clearly visible in the international 
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news media that dissidence suddenly exploded onto the scene in November 2010 to 
January 2011. Those within these fields continue to redefine the rules and structures 
governing production and despite the historical precedence of political dissidence within 
cultural production, the artists are in many ways entering new territory.  
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not mention the role academics alongside 
jounalists as critics maintain in the consecration of actors. A stalwart advocate of 
reflexive sociology, Bourdieu stated: “All critics declare not only the judgment of the 
work, but also their claim to talk about it and judge it. In short, they take part in a struggle 
for the monopoly of legitimate discourse about the work of art, and consequently in the 
production of the value of the work of art.”199 In this dynamic, those celebrating the 
importance or denouncing irrelevance of a work of art are declaring their own importance 
in its deciphering and interpretation. Academics are of course no exception to this rule 
and attempts to explain the recent so-called “waves” of protest scouring the political 
landscape of the MENA region, constitute competition not only within the academic field 
but within the revolutionary field as well. This power arises from the ability of scholars to 
consecrate or denounce those within a revolution as important or not. This power is not, 
as was shown in this thesis, that of academics alone, but also that of journalists, 
filmmakers, bloggers, graffiti artist, general public opinion, etc. However, it is only right 
that we acknowledge this power and this dynamic, in order to show a more expansive 
view of the actors involved in recent revolutionary events, and the limitations of our own 
gaze because of the tools we use. Academics, however, should be more aware of this 
dynamic (than the other consecratory mechanisms/analysts) in order to be careful when 
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engaging in this rat race to explain the revolutions, and thus the people and social bodies 
we empower and neutralize in the process. 
Bourdieu also warned that “the social scientist’s job is not to draw a dividing line 
between agents involved in it [the boundaries of a field] by imposing so called 
operational definition, which is most likely to be imposed on him by his own prejudices 
and presuppositions, but to describe a state (long-lasting or temporary) of these struggles 
and therefore of the frontier delimiting the territory held by competing agents.”200 This 
advice is well-founded, and I have attempted to portray the temporary state of the 
Tunisian musical, journalism, activism, and revolutionary fields in addition to competing 
definitions within the fields of Tunisian cultural production as well as within academic 
scholarship. In so doing, I hope the reader is convinced that they were indeed that; 
temporary. These boundaries and categories are in a constant state of flux and what I 
have attempted to illustrate is an interpretation of these fields at a precise moment in time 
in order to complicate the simplistic, reductionist, and essentializing analyses that abound 
at the time of this writing. I am also quite aware, as is stated above, that the analysis of 
consecratory agents may also be applied to any researcher, academic or otherwise. 
Therefore Bourdieu was indeed right in his warning, and yet, just as he often advocated 
the application of sociological analytics to the social science field, this analysis hopefully 
does speak to the current frustrating competition among academics to analyze these 
historic events. Thus I submit this work aware (with ‘eyes open’ as is said) of its ability 
to creep beyond what is articulated herein, and be applied to myself as well. Simply by 
being aware of capital dynamics of the fields in which we are active unfortunately does 
not mean that we are able to transcend them. 
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